
Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Meaning
"To Follow a Rule Blindly"
Alexander Miller(Author)
Oxford University Press
Published on 15. August 2024
Book
Hardback
184 pages
978-0-19-285648-7 (ISBN)
Description
Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Meaning develops a new, non-reductionist, response to the sceptical argument about meaning famously developed in Saul Kripke's book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy, it begins by outlining an intuitive notion of following a rule, explaining its relationship to the notions of linguistic meaning and intentional content. It then gives an outline and development of Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument, going into detail on the arguments against reductive dispositional accounts of meaning. It also explains Kripke's Wittgenstein's objections to non-reductionist views which take semantic and intentional facts to be primitive and sui generis and argues against views (such as error theories and forms of non-factualism) which attempt to respond to the argument by conceding that there are no meaning facts. The position advocated in the book emerges from a response to recent arguments developed by Paul Boghossian ("The Inference Problem") and Crispin Wright ("The Minor Premise Problem") which appear to imply that rule-following and competent language use are impossible. The arguments of Boghossian and Wright are then blocked via a new account of Wittgenstein's remarks on the notion of "following a rule blindly" or "blind rule-following" that connects it to the Wittgensteinian idea that there is a way of following a rule that does not involve interpretation. In turn, this is used to generate a response to Kripke: understanding an expression is a matter of having an intention to exercise one's ability to use it in accord with its meaning or correctness condition.
Reviews / Votes
The discussion in WPM is rich in detail, and readers interested in new work on the problem(s) of rule-following will find chapters 4 and 5 highly rewarding. * Elek Lane, Muse * Miller's book is an impressive and substantial contribution to the post Kripkean landscape and the debates surrounding rule-following, normativity, and meaning-scepticism. It will be of significant interest to philosophers and postgraduates working on these topics. * Ali Hossein Khani, The Philosophical Quarterly * This book is highly recommended for anyone interested in this nexus of issues about rule-following and meaning. Miller has a commanding grasp of the landscape in which these issues are embedded and a wonderfully clear way of explaining them. * Paul Boghossian, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
College/higher education
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Cloth over boards
Dimensions
Height: 218 mm
Width: 148 mm
Thickness: 17 mm
Weight
367 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-285648-7 (9780192856487)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

E-Book
07/2024
OUP eBook
€76.99
Available for download

E-Book
07/2024
OUP eBook
€76.99
Available for download
Person
Alexander Miller is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Otago, New Zealand. He was educated at the universities of Glasgow, St. Andrews, and Michigan (Ann Arbor). He has previously held teaching positions at Nottingham, Birmingham, Cardiff, and Macquarie. He is an associate editor of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Content
Introduction
1: Rule-Following, Meaning, and Content
2: Kripkeas Wittgensteinas Sceptical Argument
3: Boghossian and Wright on Blind Rule-Following
4: Blind Rule-Following, Properly Construed
5: A Non-Reductionist Response to Kripkeas Wittgensteinas Sceptical Argument
Epilogue
1: Rule-Following, Meaning, and Content
2: Kripkeas Wittgensteinas Sceptical Argument
3: Boghossian and Wright on Blind Rule-Following
4: Blind Rule-Following, Properly Construed
5: A Non-Reductionist Response to Kripkeas Wittgensteinas Sceptical Argument
Epilogue