Goldman and His Critics
1st Edition
Published on 11. October 2016
Book
Hardback
400 pages
978-0-470-67367-6 (ISBN)
Description
Goldman and His Critics presents a series of original essays contributed by influential philosophers who critically examine Alvin Goldman's work, followed by Goldman's responses to each essay.
Critiques Alvin Goldman's groundbreaking theories, writings, and ideas on a range of philosophical topics
Features contributions from some of the most important and influential contemporary philosophers
Covers Goldman's views on epistemology-both individual and social-in addition to cognitive science and metaphysics
Pays special attention to Goldman's writings on philosophy of mind, including the evolution of his thoughts on Simulation-Theory (ST)
Critiques Alvin Goldman's groundbreaking theories, writings, and ideas on a range of philosophical topics
Features contributions from some of the most important and influential contemporary philosophers
Covers Goldman's views on epistemology-both individual and social-in addition to cognitive science and metaphysics
Pays special attention to Goldman's writings on philosophy of mind, including the evolution of his thoughts on Simulation-Theory (ST)
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Hoboken
United Kingdom
Publishing group
John Wiley and Sons Ltd
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Cloth over boards
Dimensions
Height: 231 mm
Width: 152 mm
Thickness: 23 mm
Weight
635 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-470-67367-6 (9780470673676)
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Brian P. Mclaughlin | Hilary Kornblith
Goldman and His Critics
Book
10/2016
1st Edition
Wiley
€50.50
Shipment within 10-20 days
Brian P. Mclaughlin | Hilary Kornblith
Goldman and His Critics
E-Book
08/2016
Wiley-Blackwell
€43.99
Available for download
Brian P. Mclaughlin | Hilary Kornblith
Goldman and His Critics
E-Book
08/2016
Wiley-Blackwell
€42.99
Available for download
Persons
Hilary Kornblith is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA. He is the author of Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground (1993); Knowledge and its Place in Nature (2002); On Reflection (2012); and A Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected Papers (2014).
Brian P. McLaughlin is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University, New Jersey. He has published numerous articles on topics relating to the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, and metaphysics.
Brian P. McLaughlin is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University, New Jersey. He has published numerous articles on topics relating to the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, and metaphysics.
Content
List of Contributors vii
Foreword ix
Alvin I. Goldman
Preface x
Part I Reliabilism, Internalism, and Externalism 1
1 Internalism, Reliabilism, and Deontology 3
Michael Williams
Reply to Michael Williams
2 Goldman against Internalism 22
Laurence BonJour
Reply to BonJour
3 Historical versus Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology 43
Thomas Kelly
Reply to Kelly
4 The Justification of Memory Beliefs: Evidentialism, Reliabilism, Conservatism 69
Matthew McGrath
Reply to McGrath
5 Unreliable Testimony 88
Elizabeth Fricker
Reply to Fricker
Part II Epistemological Trouble-Shooting and Social Epistemology 125
6 Process Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology 127
Ernest Sosa
Reply to Sosa
7 Goldman on Evidence and Reliability 149
Jack C. Lyons
Reply to Lyons
8 A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem 178
Erik J. Olsson
Reply to Olsson
9 Veritism and Epistemic Value 200
Duncan Pritchard
Reply to Pritchard
10 The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Voter?-Specific Truth 219
Christian List and Kai Spiekermann
Reply to List and Spiekermann
Part III Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, and Metaphysics 235
11 Knowledge and Reliability 237
Jennifer Nagel
Reply to Nagel
12 Goldman on Knowledge of Mind 259
Christopher S. Hill
Reply to Hill
13 Under Influence: Is Altercentric Bias Compatible with Simulation Theory? 280
Frederique de Vignemont and Hugo Mercier
Reply to Vignemont and Mercier
14 Finding the Body in the Brain: From Simulation Theory to Embodied Simulation 297
Vittorio Gallese
Reply to Gallese
15 Embodiment in Perception: Will We Know It When We See It? 318
Chaz Firestone
Reply to Firestone
16 Cognitive Science and Metaphysics: Partners in Debunking 337
Jonathan Schaffer
Reply to Schaffer
Appendix: Alvin Goldman's Publications 369
Index 379
Foreword ix
Alvin I. Goldman
Preface x
Part I Reliabilism, Internalism, and Externalism 1
1 Internalism, Reliabilism, and Deontology 3
Michael Williams
Reply to Michael Williams
2 Goldman against Internalism 22
Laurence BonJour
Reply to BonJour
3 Historical versus Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology 43
Thomas Kelly
Reply to Kelly
4 The Justification of Memory Beliefs: Evidentialism, Reliabilism, Conservatism 69
Matthew McGrath
Reply to McGrath
5 Unreliable Testimony 88
Elizabeth Fricker
Reply to Fricker
Part II Epistemological Trouble-Shooting and Social Epistemology 125
6 Process Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology 127
Ernest Sosa
Reply to Sosa
7 Goldman on Evidence and Reliability 149
Jack C. Lyons
Reply to Lyons
8 A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem 178
Erik J. Olsson
Reply to Olsson
9 Veritism and Epistemic Value 200
Duncan Pritchard
Reply to Pritchard
10 The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Voter?-Specific Truth 219
Christian List and Kai Spiekermann
Reply to List and Spiekermann
Part III Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, and Metaphysics 235
11 Knowledge and Reliability 237
Jennifer Nagel
Reply to Nagel
12 Goldman on Knowledge of Mind 259
Christopher S. Hill
Reply to Hill
13 Under Influence: Is Altercentric Bias Compatible with Simulation Theory? 280
Frederique de Vignemont and Hugo Mercier
Reply to Vignemont and Mercier
14 Finding the Body in the Brain: From Simulation Theory to Embodied Simulation 297
Vittorio Gallese
Reply to Gallese
15 Embodiment in Perception: Will We Know It When We See It? 318
Chaz Firestone
Reply to Firestone
16 Cognitive Science and Metaphysics: Partners in Debunking 337
Jonathan Schaffer
Reply to Schaffer
Appendix: Alvin Goldman's Publications 369
Index 379