
Getting Things Right
Fittingness, Reasons, and Value
Oxford University Press
Published on 28. October 2022
Book
Hardback
224 pages
978-0-19-881032-2 (ISBN)
Description
Some of our attitudes are fitting, others unfitting. It seems fitting to admire Mandela, but not Idi Amin, and to believe that the Seine flows through Paris, but not that the Thames does. Fitting attitudes get things right. Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that fittingness is the key to understanding the normative domain-the domain of reasons, obligations, and value. They develop and defend a novel 'fittingness first' approach, on which fittingness is a normatively basic property and all other normative properties depend on fittingness. They show how this approach illuminates central questions in ethics and epistemology.
Reviews / Votes
A model of clarity, packed with arguments. A must-read for anyone working on normativity. * Hille Paakkunainen, Syracuse University * This excellent book offers the most comprehensive and compelling development to date of the important fittingness-first approach to normative theorizing. It is essential reading for philosophers interested in the nature of normative reasons and normativity more broadly. * Justin Snedegar, University of St. Andrews * The book is an admirable work of scholarship. * Christopher Howard, Ethics *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
College/higher education
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Cloth over boards
Dimensions
Height: 221 mm
Width: 155 mm
Thickness: 28 mm
Weight
476 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-881032-2 (9780198810322)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

E-Book
10/2022
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€49.99
Available for download

E-Book
09/2022
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€49.99
Available for download
Persons
Conor McHugh is Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He has worked on a range of topics in epistemology, value theory, and philosophy of mind. These include the nature of belief and of attitudes more generally, normativity, reasons and reasoning, mental agency, doxastic non-voluntarism, and self-knowledge. He has published on these topics in leading journals such as Ethics, Mind, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. He is the co-editor, with Jonathan Way and Daniel Whiting, of Normativity: Epistemic and Practical (OUP, 2018) and Metaepistemology (OUP, 2018).
Jonathan Way is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He works on a range of topics in ethics and epistemology. He is especially interested in questions about reasons, rationality, value, and normativity, across the epistemic, practical, and affective domains. He has published on these issues in leading journals such as Ethics, Mind, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. He is the co-editor, with Conor McHugh and Daniel Whiting, of Normativity: Epistemic and Practical (OUP, 2018) and Metaepistemology (OUP, 2018).
Jonathan Way is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He works on a range of topics in ethics and epistemology. He is especially interested in questions about reasons, rationality, value, and normativity, across the epistemic, practical, and affective domains. He has published on these issues in leading journals such as Ethics, Mind, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. He is the co-editor, with Conor McHugh and Daniel Whiting, of Normativity: Epistemic and Practical (OUP, 2018) and Metaepistemology (OUP, 2018).
Author
Associate Professor in PhilosophyUniversity of Southampton
Professor of PhilosophyUniversity of Southampton
Content
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1: Reasons
- 2: Good Reasoning
- 3: Fittingness
- 4: Value
- 5: The Explanatory Role of Reasons I: The Weights of Reasons
- 6: The Explanatory Role of Reasons II: From Weights to Deontic Status
- 7: Reasons for Belief, Action and Emotions
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index