Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy
An Inquiry into the Interest-Group Theory of Government
Published on 23. August 2014
Book
Paperback/Softback
VIII, 124 pages
978-94-009-8155-3 (ISBN)
More details
Series
Edition
Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1981
Language
English
Place of publication
Dordrecht
Netherlands
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Research
Illustrations
VIII, 124 p.
Dimensions
Height: 223 mm
Width: 152 mm
Thickness: 9 mm
Weight
220 gr
ISBN-13
978-94-009-8155-3 (9789400981553)
DOI
10.1007/978-94-009-8153-9
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
R.E. McCormick | Robert D. Tollison
Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy
An Inquiry into the Interest-Group Theory of Government
Book
05/1981
Kluwer Academic Publishers
€106.99
Shipment within 3-4 weeks
Content
1 Analyzing Government.- Two Approaches to Analyzing Government.- The Interest-Group Theory of Government.- Plan of the Study.- Notes.- 2 Questions to be Answered.- Wealth Transfers and Organization Costs.- The "Market" for Wealth Transfers.- What This Analysis Is Not About.- What This Analysis Is About.- Summary.- Appendix: Heterogeneity Begets Wealth Redistribution.- Notes.- 3 The Demand and Supply of Wealth Transfers.- Maximizing the Returns from Legislation in a Bicameral.- Vote Market.- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures.- Summary.- Notes.- 4 Legislatures as Wage Cartels.- Theory and Preliminary Implications.- A Test of Relative Wage Implications.- Wage Pay and Malfeasance.- Summary.- Notes.- 5 The Outside Earnings of Politicians.- The Market for Legislators.- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures.- Low Wage Pay as an Entry Barrier in Politics.- Summary.- Notes.- 6 The Supply of Majority Leadership.- Competition for Majority Leadership.- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures.- Summary.- Notes.- 7 The Determinants of Executive Branch Compensation.- Gubernatorial Compensation.- The Question of Malfeasance.- Summary.- Notes.- 8 Summary, Conclusions, and Future Directions.- Notes.- Name Index.