Political Game Theory
An Introduction
Published on 8. January 2007
Book
Hardback
446 pages
978-0-521-84107-8 (ISBN)
Description
Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.
Reviews / Votes
"At last, a challenging but accessible graduate-level text for a serious course in game theory for political scientists. Teaching game theory in the context of political-science examples, this book will be the standard text for many years to come." Robert Powell, BerkeleyMore details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 235 mm
Width: 157 mm
Thickness: 31 mm
Weight
870 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-521-84107-8 (9780521841078)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Book
10/2014
Cambridge University Press
€70.00
Shipment within 15-20 days
E-Book
03/2007
1st Edition
Cambridge University Press
€41.49
Available for download
E-Book
01/2007
Cambridge University Press
€35.49
Available for download
Persons
Nolan McCarty is Associate Dean and Professor of Politics and Public Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. His recent publications include Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (2006 with Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal), The Realignment of National Politics and the Income Distribution (1997 with Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal), as well as many articles in periodicals such as the American Political Science Review and the American Journal of Political Science. Adam Meirowitz is Associate Professor of Politics and Jonathan Dickenson Bicentennial Preceptor at Princeton University. Recent publications include Probabilistic Voting and Accountability in Repeated Elections with Uncertain Policy Constraints (2006) in the Journal of Public Economic Theory and In Defense of Exclusionary Deliberation: Communication and Voting with Private Beliefs and Values (2006) in the Journal of Theoretical Politics. He is a recipient of the Heinz Eulau Award from the American Political Science Association and the Robert H. Durr award from the Midwest Political Science Association.
Content
1. Introduction; 2. The theory of choice; 3. Choice under uncertainty; 4. Social choice theory; 5. Games in the normal form; 6. Bayesian games in the normal form; 7. Extensive form games; 8. Dynamic games of incomplete information; 9. Repeated games; 10. Bargaining theory; 11. Mechanism design and agency theory; 12. Mathematical appendix.