Seemings
New Arguments, New Angles
1st Edition
Published on 5. May 2025
Book
Paperback/Softback
288 pages
978-1-032-28963-2 (ISBN)
Description
This volume presents new research on the epistemology of seemings. It features original essays by leading epistemologists on the nature and epistemic import of seemings and intuitions.
Seemings and intuitions are often appealed to in philosophical theorizing. In fact, epistemological theories such as phenomenal conservatism and dogmatism give pride of place to seemings. Such views insist that seemings are of central importance to theories of epistemic justification. However, there are many questions about seemings that have yet to be answered satisfactorily. What kinds of seemings are there? How do seemings justify? Are seemings connected to truth? Do they play a significant role in inquiry? The chapters in this volume offer a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas about seemings, the nature of justification and evidential support, intuitions, inquiry, and the nature of inference.
Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of mind.
Seemings and intuitions are often appealed to in philosophical theorizing. In fact, epistemological theories such as phenomenal conservatism and dogmatism give pride of place to seemings. Such views insist that seemings are of central importance to theories of epistemic justification. However, there are many questions about seemings that have yet to be answered satisfactorily. What kinds of seemings are there? How do seemings justify? Are seemings connected to truth? Do they play a significant role in inquiry? The chapters in this volume offer a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas about seemings, the nature of justification and evidential support, intuitions, inquiry, and the nature of inference.
Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of mind.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
London
United Kingdom
Publishing group
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Target group
College/higher education
Postgraduate and Undergraduate
Illustrations
7 s/w Zeichnungen, 7 s/w Abbildungen
7 Line drawings, black and white; 7 Illustrations, black and white
Dimensions
Height: 229 mm
Width: 152 mm
Thickness: 16 mm
Weight
438 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-032-28963-2 (9781032289632)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
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Taylor & Francis
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Taylor & Francis
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Persons
Kevin McCain is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. He has authored and edited several works in epistemology and philosophy of science including the following from Routledge: Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification (2014), Epistemology: 50 Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Thought Experiments (2021), What is Scientific Knowledge? An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology of Science (with Kostas Kampourakis, 2019), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles (with Scott Stapleford, 2020), and Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (with Scott Stapleford and Matthias Steup, 2021).
Scott Stapleford is Professor of Philosophy at St. Thomas University in Fredericton, Canada. His publications for Routledge include Logic Works: A Rigorous Introduction to Formal Logic (with Lorne Falkenstein and Molly Kao, 2022), Hume's Enquiry: Expanded and Explained (with Tyron Goldschmidt, 2021), Berkeley's Principles: Expanded and Explained (with Tyron Goldschmidt, 2016), and two edited collections: Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (with Kevin McCain and Matthias Steup, 2021) and Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles (with Kevin McCain, 2020).
Matthias Steup received his PhD from Brown University in 1985. He is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder, and the author of An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (1996) and numerous articles in epistemology. He is the editor of Knowledge, Truth and Duty (2001) and co-editor of Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2005, 2014), A Companion to Epistemology (2010), and Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (Routledge, 2021).
Scott Stapleford is Professor of Philosophy at St. Thomas University in Fredericton, Canada. His publications for Routledge include Logic Works: A Rigorous Introduction to Formal Logic (with Lorne Falkenstein and Molly Kao, 2022), Hume's Enquiry: Expanded and Explained (with Tyron Goldschmidt, 2021), Berkeley's Principles: Expanded and Explained (with Tyron Goldschmidt, 2016), and two edited collections: Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (with Kevin McCain and Matthias Steup, 2021) and Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles (with Kevin McCain, 2020).
Matthias Steup received his PhD from Brown University in 1985. He is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder, and the author of An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (1996) and numerous articles in epistemology. He is the editor of Knowledge, Truth and Duty (2001) and co-editor of Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2005, 2014), A Companion to Epistemology (2010), and Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (Routledge, 2021).
Content
Introductory Note Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford, and Matthias Steup Part 1: Seemings and How They Justify 1. The Chemistry of Epistemic Justification Matthias Steup 2. Seemings and Truth Blake McAllister 3. Nonsubjectivism about How Things Seem Matthew McGrath 4. Against the Phenomenal View of Evidence: Disagreement and Shared Evidence Elizabeth Jackson 5. Appearances and the Problem of Stored Beliefs Scott Stapleford and Kevin McCain 6. Emotions as Evidence for Evaluations Earl Conee and Richard Feldman 7. How to Be Irrational Michael Huemer Part 2: Seemings in Inference and Inquiry 8. Dogmatism, Seemings, and Non-Deductive Inferential Justification Berit Brogaard and Dimitria Electra Gatzia 9. Inference Without the Taking Condition Declan Smithies 10. Zetetic Seemings and Their Role in Inquiry Verena Wagner 11. Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry John Bengson Part 3: Seemings and Perception 12. Veridical Perceptual Seemings Elijah Chudnoff 13. Perceptual Seemings and Perceptual Learning Harmen Ghijsen 14. Phenomenal Explanationism and the Look of Things Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti Part 4: Intellectual Seemings and Intuitions 15. A Priori vs. A Posteriori Justification: The Central Role of Rational Intuitions Bruce Russell 16. Thought Experiments as Tools of Theory Clarification Grace Helton 17. Lessons from Commonsensism for Religious Epistemology Michael Bergmann