Game Theory
2nd Edition
Published on 25. June 2020
Book
Hardback
1050 pages
978-1-108-49345-1 (ISBN)
Description
Now in its second edition, this popular textbook on game theory is unrivalled in the breadth of its coverage, the thoroughness of technical explanations and the number of worked examples included. Covering non-cooperative and cooperative games, this introduction to game theory includes advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. This edition contains new material on stochastic games, rationalizability, and the continuity of the set of equilibrium points with respect to the data of the game. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a range of disciplines. With numerous exercises, and the addition of a solution manual for instructors with this edition, the book is an extensive guide to game theory for undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences, and will also serve as useful reference for researchers.
Reviews / Votes
Praise for first edition: 'This is the book for which the world has been waiting for decades: a definitive, comprehensive account of the mathematical theory of games, by three of the world's biggest experts on the subject. Rigorous yet eminently readable, deep yet comprehensible, replete with a large variety of important real-world applications, it will remain the standard reference in game theory for a very long time.' Robert Aumann, Nobel Laureate in Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Praise for first edition: 'Without any sacrifice on the depth or the clarity of the exposition, this book is amazing in its breadth of coverage of the important ideas of game theory. It covers classical game theory, including utility theory, equilibrium refinements and belief hierarchies; classical cooperative game theory, including the core, Shapley value, bargaining set and nucleolus; major applications, including social choice, auctions, matching and mechanism design; and the relevant mathematics of linear programming and fixed point theory. The comprehensive coverage combined with the depth and clarity of exposition makes it an ideal book not only to learn game theory from, but also to have on the shelves of working game theorists.' Ehud Kalai, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University Praise for first edition: 'The best and the most comprehensive textbook for advanced courses in game theory.' David Schmeidler, Ohio State University and Tel Aviv University Praise for first edition: 'There are quite a few good textbooks on game theory now, but for rigor and breadth this one stands out.' Eric S. Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics, Harvard University, Massachusetts Praise for first edition: 'This textbook provides an exceptionally clear and comprehensive introduction to both cooperative and noncooperative game theory. It deftly combines a rigorous exposition of the key mathematical results with a wealth of illuminating examples drawn from a wide range of subjects. It is a tour de force.' Peyton Young, University of Oxford Praise for first edition: 'This is a wonderful introduction to game theory, written in a way that allows it to serve both as a text for a course and as a reference ... The book is written by leading figures in the field [whose] broad view of the field suffuses the material.' Joe Halpern, Cornell University, New YorkMore details
Edition
2nd Revised edition
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
College/higher education
Edition type
Revised edition
Illustrations
Worked examples or Exercises; 292 Line drawings, black and white
Dimensions
Height: 258 mm
Width: 197 mm
Thickness: 60 mm
Weight
2277 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-108-49345-1 (9781108493451)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Michael Maschler | Eilon Solan | Shmuel Zamir
Game Theory
Book
06/2020
2nd Edition
Cambridge University Press
€85.30
Shipment within 15-20 days
Michael Maschler | Eilon Solan | Shmuel Zamir
Game Theory
E-Book
06/2020
2nd Edition
Cambridge University Press
€67.99
Available for download
Previous edition
Michael Maschler | Eilon Solan | Shmuel Zamir
Game Theory
Book
03/2013
Cambridge University Press
€81.83
Article exhausted; check for reprint
Persons
Michael Maschler was a Professor at the Einstein Institute of Mathematics and the Center for the Study of Rationality at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. He greatly contributed to cooperative game theory and to repeated games with incomplete information.
Content
1. The game of chess; 2. Utility theory; 3. Extensive-form games; 4. Strategic-form games; 5. Mixed strategies; 6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem; 7. Equilibrium refinements; 8. Correlated equilibria; 9. Games with incomplete information and common priors; 10. Games with incomplete information: the general model; 11. The universal belief space; 12. Auctions; 13. Repeated games; 14. Repeated games with vector payoffs; 15. Social choice; 16. Bargaining games; 17. Coalitional games with transferable utility; 18. The core; 19. The Shapley value; 20. The bargaining set; 21. The nucleolus; 22. Stable matching; 23. Appendices.