Judging Positivism

1. Setting the Stage: Practical Reason and Norms Reconsidered
I. Practical Reason and Norms and Exclusionary Reasons
II. Exclusionary Reasons and the Legal Sphere: Issues of Method and Substance
III. Between Chaos and Order: Judges as Wielders of Our Collective Fate
IV. Common Law Systems: A Counter-Example
2. Between Fact and Value
I. The Sources Thesis Defined and Defended
II. Raz's Rule-Plus-Exception Model
III. Casting Law in a New Light
IV. Identifying Rules: A Herculean Task
V. Between Fact and Value
3. The Perils of Positivism: Why Raz becomes a Realist
I. Law's Autonomy Considered and Reconsidered
II. Legal Rights and Legal Realism
III. Back to the Settled Core
IV. Law's Claim to Authority: Raz's Way Out?
V. A Story about Law and Order Retold
4. Raz's The Morality of Freedom: Two Models of Authority
I. Raz's Focal Concept of Authority
II. The Analogy of the Arbitrator: From Consent to Normal Justification
III. Pre-emption versus Normal Justification: Seeking Coherence
IV. Methodology: The Source of the Tension?
V. Co-ordination Problems and Razian Authority
5. Law as Public Practical Reasons Revisited
I. The Sources Thesis: Defined and Redefined
II. Sources, Certainty, and Public Practical Reasons
III. The Weak Autonomy Thesis
IV. The Sources Thesis and Interpretation: Nuance or Nuisance?
V. Why Reason like Raz?
VI. Law and Order: Some Reflections on Method
6. The Path Not Taken
I. Hart and the Internal Aspect of Rules
II. A Little Help from Holmes
III. Between Chaos and Legality: The Sources of Certainty
IV. Content Matters
V. Is Law Merely Conventional?
7. The Raz-Postema Debate Deconstructed
Law as Public Practical Reason: Raz versus Postema
A. Law's Ultimate Aspiration is Justice
B. Law's Overarching Function
C. The Autonomy Thesis
D. The Limited Domain Thesis
E. The Argument from Co-operation
F. Methodology and Law's Importance
G. The Relationship between the Pre-emption Thesis and the Sources Thesis
H. The Certainty Thesis
I. The Sources Thesis
J. The Pre-emption Thesis