Mind and Cognition
An Anthology
3rd Edition
Published on 10. January 2008
Book
Hardback
896 pages
978-1-4051-5784-1 (ISBN)
Description
First published in 1990, Mind and Cognition: An Anthology is now firmly established as a popular teaching apparatus for upper level undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of mind.
Brings together the most important classic and contemporary articles in philosophy of mind and cognition
Completely revised and updated throughout, in response to feedback from teachers in the field
Now includes 20 new readings
Each updated part opens with a brief, synoptic introduction to the individual field and a comprehensive further reading list
Each section also includes three to four of the most influential papers that have been written in the philosophy of mind over the last 40 years
Brings together the most important classic and contemporary articles in philosophy of mind and cognition
Completely revised and updated throughout, in response to feedback from teachers in the field
Now includes 20 new readings
Each updated part opens with a brief, synoptic introduction to the individual field and a comprehensive further reading list
Each section also includes three to four of the most influential papers that have been written in the philosophy of mind over the last 40 years
Reviews / Votes
"Since it appeared almost 20 years ago, Mind and Cognition has been the premiere anthology in contemporary philosophy of mind. This judiciously updated edition secures its position for the foreseeable future."Shaun Nichols, University of Arizona
"An enormously useful collection, including representative articles not only on the multitude of positions before and after the 'cognitive revolution', but also on topics such as the emotions, animal minds and distinctively perceptual content that have only recently begun to receive the attention they deserve. An ideal text for both introductory and graduate study of the many topics."
Georges Rey, University of Maryland
More details
Series
Edition
3rd edition
Language
English
Place of publication
Hoboken
United Kingdom
Publishing group
John Wiley and Sons Ltd
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Cloth over boards
Dimensions
Height: 254 mm
Width: 180 mm
Thickness: 52 mm
Weight
1678 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-4051-5784-1 (9781405157841)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Book
01/2008
3rd Edition
Wiley
€41.00
Shipment within 3-4 weeks
Previous edition
Book
01/1999
2nd Edition
Blackwell Publishers
€43.51
Article exhausted; check for reprint
Persons
William G. Lycan is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He has published widely in the field of philosophy of mind and language. His publications include Consciousness (1987), Judgement and Justification (1988), and Consciousness and Experience (1996).
Jesse J. Prinz is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He works primarily in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. His books include Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis (2002), Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (2004), and The Emotional Construction of Morals (2007).
Jesse J. Prinz is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He works primarily in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. His books include Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis (2002), Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (2004), and The Emotional Construction of Morals (2007).
Content
Preface to the Third Edition. Preface to the First Edition.
Acknowledgements.
Part I: Ontology: The Identity Theory and Functionalism:.
Introduction.
Behaviorism.
1. Excerpt from About Behaviorism: B. F. Skinner.
The Identity Theory and Machine Functionalism.
2. Is Consciousness a Brain Process?: U. T. Place.
Causal and Functionalist Views.
3. The Causal Theory of Mind: D. M. Armstrong.
4. The Nature of Mental States: Hilary Putnam.
5. Troubles with Functionalism (excerpt): Ned Block.
Anomalous Monism.
6. Mental Events: Donald Davidson.
Homuncular and Teleological Functionalism.
7. The Continuity of Levels of Nature: William G. Lycan.
Part II: Intentionality:.
Introduction.
Psychosemantics.
8. Information and Representation: Jerry A. Fodor.
9. Biosemantics: Ruth Garrett Millikan.
10. A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics (excerpt): Barry Loewer.
Other Approaches to Intentionality.
11. Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality: Robert Brandom.
Part III: The Computational Theory of Mind and Artificial Intelligence.
Introduction.
The Language of Thought and Computationalism.
12. Why There Has to Be and How There Could Be a Private Language: Jerry A. Fodor.
13. Which Language Do We Think With?: Peter Carruthers.
Artificial Intelligence.
14. Semantic Engines: An Introduction to Mind Design: John Haugeland.
15. Can Computers Think?: John R. Searle.
Part IV: Eliminativism, Neurophilosophy, and Anti-Representationalism.
Introduction.
Eliminativism.
16. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes: Paul M. Churchland.
Connectionism.
17. Neural Representation and Neural Computation: Patricia Smith Churchland and Terrence Sejnowski.
18. Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture (excerpt): Jerry A. Fodor and Zenon W. Pylyshyn.
Dynamical Systems Theory and Robotics.
19. What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?: Tim Van Gelder.
20. Intelligence Without Representation: Rodney A. Brooks.
Part V: Instrumentalism and Folk Psychology.
Introduction.
Instrumentalism.
21. True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works: Daniel C. Dennett.
22. Dennett on Intentional Systems: Stephen P. Stich.
23. Real Patterns: Daniel C. Dennett.
Simulationism and the Theory Theory.
24. Folk Psychology as Simulation: Robert M. Gordon.
25. Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory? (excerpt): Stephen P. Stich and Shaun Nichols.
Part VI: Mental Causation, Externalism, and Self-Knowledge.
Introduction.
For and Against Folk Psychology.
26. Autonomous Psychology and the Belief--Desire Thesis: Stephen P. Stich.
27. Folk Psychology is Here to Stay: Terence Horgan and James Woodward.
Supervenient Causation.
28. Mental Causation: Jaegwon Kim.
29. Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical: Brian P. McLaughlin.
For and Against Externalism.
30. Individualism and Supervenience: Jerry A. Fodor.
31. The Argument from Causal Powers: Robert A. Wilson.
32. Reference, Causal Powers, Externalist Intuitions, and Unicorns: Gabriel M. A. Segal.
Self-Knowledge.
33. Knowing One's Own Mind: Donald Davidson.
34. Externalism and Inference: Paul A. Boghossian.
Radical Externalism.
35. The Extended Mind: Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers.
Part VII: Consciousness, Qualia, and Subjectivity.
Introduction.
What Is Consciousness?.
36. How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness: Ned Block.
37. What Should We Expect from a Theory of Consciousness?: Patricia S. Churchland.
38. Consciousness and its Place in Nature (excerpt): David J. Chalmers.
Conscious Awareness.
39. A Theory of Consciousness (excerpt): David M. Rosenthal.
40. The Superiority of HOP to HOT: William G. Lycan.
41. Perception without Awareness: Fred Dretske.
What It's Like.
42. Epiphenomenal Qualia: Frank Jackson.
43. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos?: Robert Van Gulick.
Qualia.
44. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience: Gilbert Harman.
45. Sensation and the Content of Experience: Christopher Peacocke.
46. Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: Michael Tye.
Part VIII: Perceptual Content.
Introduction.
47. Simple Seeing: Fred Dretske.
48. Excerpts from The Varieties of Reference: Gareth Evans.
49. Non-conceptual Content: John McDowell.
50. Experience Without the Head: Alva Noe.
Part IX: Animal Minds.
Introduction.
51. Rational Animals: Donald Davidson.
52. The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything it is Like to be a Honey Bee?: Michael Tye.
53. Why the Question of Animal Consciousness Might Not Matter Very Much: Peter Carruthers.
Part X: Emotion.
Introduction.
54. Emotions and Choice: Robert C. Solomon.
55. Embodied Emotions: Jesse Prinz.
56. Is Emotion a Natural Kind?: Paul E. Griffiths.
Index
Acknowledgements.
Part I: Ontology: The Identity Theory and Functionalism:.
Introduction.
Behaviorism.
1. Excerpt from About Behaviorism: B. F. Skinner.
The Identity Theory and Machine Functionalism.
2. Is Consciousness a Brain Process?: U. T. Place.
Causal and Functionalist Views.
3. The Causal Theory of Mind: D. M. Armstrong.
4. The Nature of Mental States: Hilary Putnam.
5. Troubles with Functionalism (excerpt): Ned Block.
Anomalous Monism.
6. Mental Events: Donald Davidson.
Homuncular and Teleological Functionalism.
7. The Continuity of Levels of Nature: William G. Lycan.
Part II: Intentionality:.
Introduction.
Psychosemantics.
8. Information and Representation: Jerry A. Fodor.
9. Biosemantics: Ruth Garrett Millikan.
10. A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics (excerpt): Barry Loewer.
Other Approaches to Intentionality.
11. Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality: Robert Brandom.
Part III: The Computational Theory of Mind and Artificial Intelligence.
Introduction.
The Language of Thought and Computationalism.
12. Why There Has to Be and How There Could Be a Private Language: Jerry A. Fodor.
13. Which Language Do We Think With?: Peter Carruthers.
Artificial Intelligence.
14. Semantic Engines: An Introduction to Mind Design: John Haugeland.
15. Can Computers Think?: John R. Searle.
Part IV: Eliminativism, Neurophilosophy, and Anti-Representationalism.
Introduction.
Eliminativism.
16. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes: Paul M. Churchland.
Connectionism.
17. Neural Representation and Neural Computation: Patricia Smith Churchland and Terrence Sejnowski.
18. Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture (excerpt): Jerry A. Fodor and Zenon W. Pylyshyn.
Dynamical Systems Theory and Robotics.
19. What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?: Tim Van Gelder.
20. Intelligence Without Representation: Rodney A. Brooks.
Part V: Instrumentalism and Folk Psychology.
Introduction.
Instrumentalism.
21. True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works: Daniel C. Dennett.
22. Dennett on Intentional Systems: Stephen P. Stich.
23. Real Patterns: Daniel C. Dennett.
Simulationism and the Theory Theory.
24. Folk Psychology as Simulation: Robert M. Gordon.
25. Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory? (excerpt): Stephen P. Stich and Shaun Nichols.
Part VI: Mental Causation, Externalism, and Self-Knowledge.
Introduction.
For and Against Folk Psychology.
26. Autonomous Psychology and the Belief--Desire Thesis: Stephen P. Stich.
27. Folk Psychology is Here to Stay: Terence Horgan and James Woodward.
Supervenient Causation.
28. Mental Causation: Jaegwon Kim.
29. Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical: Brian P. McLaughlin.
For and Against Externalism.
30. Individualism and Supervenience: Jerry A. Fodor.
31. The Argument from Causal Powers: Robert A. Wilson.
32. Reference, Causal Powers, Externalist Intuitions, and Unicorns: Gabriel M. A. Segal.
Self-Knowledge.
33. Knowing One's Own Mind: Donald Davidson.
34. Externalism and Inference: Paul A. Boghossian.
Radical Externalism.
35. The Extended Mind: Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers.
Part VII: Consciousness, Qualia, and Subjectivity.
Introduction.
What Is Consciousness?.
36. How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness: Ned Block.
37. What Should We Expect from a Theory of Consciousness?: Patricia S. Churchland.
38. Consciousness and its Place in Nature (excerpt): David J. Chalmers.
Conscious Awareness.
39. A Theory of Consciousness (excerpt): David M. Rosenthal.
40. The Superiority of HOP to HOT: William G. Lycan.
41. Perception without Awareness: Fred Dretske.
What It's Like.
42. Epiphenomenal Qualia: Frank Jackson.
43. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos?: Robert Van Gulick.
Qualia.
44. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience: Gilbert Harman.
45. Sensation and the Content of Experience: Christopher Peacocke.
46. Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: Michael Tye.
Part VIII: Perceptual Content.
Introduction.
47. Simple Seeing: Fred Dretske.
48. Excerpts from The Varieties of Reference: Gareth Evans.
49. Non-conceptual Content: John McDowell.
50. Experience Without the Head: Alva Noe.
Part IX: Animal Minds.
Introduction.
51. Rational Animals: Donald Davidson.
52. The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything it is Like to be a Honey Bee?: Michael Tye.
53. Why the Question of Animal Consciousness Might Not Matter Very Much: Peter Carruthers.
Part X: Emotion.
Introduction.
54. Emotions and Choice: Robert C. Solomon.
55. Embodied Emotions: Jesse Prinz.
56. Is Emotion a Natural Kind?: Paul E. Griffiths.
Index