
New Directions in Market Design
University of Chicago Press
Will be published approx. on 24. February 2026
Book
Hardback
240 pages
978-0-226-84659-0 (ISBN)
Description
A comprehensive survey of the evolution of market design over the past three decades.
In the mid-1990s, the first Federal Communications Commission spectrum auction and the redesign of the National Residency Matching Program collectively helped to jumpstart the field of market design. Since then, extensive research has improved auction design and broken new conceptual ground in addressing multi-agent matching problems. This volume summarizes key discoveries and advances in market design over the past three decades and explores contemporary challenges-from climate policy and electricity markets to AI-mediated exchanges and hospital resource allocation.
Contributors examine how to design efficient, incentive-compatible mechanisms that are robust to shifting conditions and increasing complexity. They consider a wide variety of applications that could benefit from the market design viewpoint, such as environmental markets, school choice, and organ exchange. Together, the chapters illustrate the important interactions between economic theory, computational tools, and institutional insight.
In the mid-1990s, the first Federal Communications Commission spectrum auction and the redesign of the National Residency Matching Program collectively helped to jumpstart the field of market design. Since then, extensive research has improved auction design and broken new conceptual ground in addressing multi-agent matching problems. This volume summarizes key discoveries and advances in market design over the past three decades and explores contemporary challenges-from climate policy and electricity markets to AI-mediated exchanges and hospital resource allocation.
Contributors examine how to design efficient, incentive-compatible mechanisms that are robust to shifting conditions and increasing complexity. They consider a wide variety of applications that could benefit from the market design viewpoint, such as environmental markets, school choice, and organ exchange. Together, the chapters illustrate the important interactions between economic theory, computational tools, and institutional insight.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Chicago
United States
Publishing group
The University of Chicago Press
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
5 halftones, 12 line drawings, 3 tables
Dimensions
Height: 229 mm
Width: 152 mm
Thickness: 25 mm
Weight
481 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-226-84659-0 (9780226846590)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Persons
Irene Lo is assistant professor of management science and engineering at Stanford University. Michael Ostrovsky is the Fred H. Merrill Professor of Economics at Stanford Graduate School of Business and a research associate of the NBER. Parag A. Pathak is the Class of 1922 Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he is also the founder and director of Blueprint Labs, and a research associate of the NBER.
Content
Introduction
Irene Yuan Lo, Michael Ostrovsky, and Parag A. Pathak
1. Market Design and Maintenance
Alvin E. Roth
2. Market Design for the Environment
Estelle Cantillon and Aurelie Slechten
3. Market Design for Surface Water
Billy A. Ferguson and Paul Milgrom
4. Market Shaping to Combat Climate Change
William Arnesen and Rachel Glennerster
5. Challenges in Designing Electricity Spot Markets
Mete Seref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, and Johannes Knoerr
6. Artificial Intelligence and Market Design: Lessons Learned from Radio Spectrum Reallocation
Kevin Leyton-Brown, Paul Milgrom, Neil Newman, and Ilya Segal
7. Influencing Policy and Transforming Institutions: Lessons from Kidney/Liver Exchange
Tayfun Soenmez and M. Utku UEnver
8. Matching Hospital Resources with Patients in Need
Fanyin Zheng
9. The Provision of Information and Incentives in School Assignment Mechanisms
Derek Neal and Joseph Root
Author Index
Subject Index
Irene Yuan Lo, Michael Ostrovsky, and Parag A. Pathak
1. Market Design and Maintenance
Alvin E. Roth
2. Market Design for the Environment
Estelle Cantillon and Aurelie Slechten
3. Market Design for Surface Water
Billy A. Ferguson and Paul Milgrom
4. Market Shaping to Combat Climate Change
William Arnesen and Rachel Glennerster
5. Challenges in Designing Electricity Spot Markets
Mete Seref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, and Johannes Knoerr
6. Artificial Intelligence and Market Design: Lessons Learned from Radio Spectrum Reallocation
Kevin Leyton-Brown, Paul Milgrom, Neil Newman, and Ilya Segal
7. Influencing Policy and Transforming Institutions: Lessons from Kidney/Liver Exchange
Tayfun Soenmez and M. Utku UEnver
8. Matching Hospital Resources with Patients in Need
Fanyin Zheng
9. The Provision of Information and Incentives in School Assignment Mechanisms
Derek Neal and Joseph Root
Author Index
Subject Index