Luck Egalitarianism
Published on 8. October 2015
Book
Hardback
280 pages
978-1-4725-7043-7 (ISBN)
Description
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen tackles the major questions concerning luck egalitarianism, providing deep, penetrating and original discussion of recent academic discourses on distributive justice as well as responses to some of the main objections in the literature. He offers a new answer to the "Why equality?" and "Equality of what?" questions, and provides a robust luck egalitarian response to the recent criticisms of luck egalitarianism by social relations egalitarians.
This systematic, theoretical introduction illustrates the broader picture of distributive justice and enables the reader to understand the core intuitions underlying, or conflicting with, luck egalitarianism.
This systematic, theoretical introduction illustrates the broader picture of distributive justice and enables the reader to understand the core intuitions underlying, or conflicting with, luck egalitarianism.
Reviews / Votes
This brilliant and challenging book ... Illuminates different conceptions of luck, as found in the philosophical literature, clarifies the difference between telic and deontic equality, and explains the 'levelling down' problem and the way that this affects luck egalitarians, and egalitarians more generally. * Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews * Lippert-Rasmussen's book offers both a reliable and critically sophisticated guide to the debate on luck egalitarianism from one of its shrewdest and most subtle contributors, and also advances several new interesting ideas and proposals ... This book is a model of its kind. It should be read by everyone with an interest in contemporary debates on distributive justice. * Ethical Theory and Moral Practice * The book provides a well-balanced overview of luck egalitarianism with a well-chosen ordering of the different chapters ... An excellent introduction. * Ethical Perspectives * Lippert-Rasmussen's book makes a tremendous contribution to our understanding of luck egalitarianism and will no doubt become a central reference point for both its proponents and its critics. * Ethics *More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
London
United Kingdom
Publishing group
Bloomsbury Publishing PLC
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 222 mm
Width: 145 mm
Thickness: 19 mm
Weight
487 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-4725-7043-7 (9781472570437)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
Luck Egalitarianism
E-Book
10/2015
1st Edition
Bloomsbury Academic
€30.99
Available for download
Person
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen is Professor of Political Theory at the University of Aarhus, Denmark and Professor II in Philosophy at the University of Tromso, Norway. His most recent book is Born Free and Equal? A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination (2013).
Content
Chapter 1. Luck egalitarianism and some close and distant relatives
1.1 Introduction
1.2 What is luck egalitarianism?
1.3 What is attractive about luck egalitarianism?
1.4 Three important luck egalitarians: Dworkin
1.5 Three important luck egalitarians: Arneson
1.6 Three important luck egalitarians: Cohen
1.7 Other distributive views
1.8 Summary
Chapter 2. Why equality?
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Formal equality
2.3 Equality of human beings
2.4 Williams on the idea of equality
2.5 Rawls on range properties
2.6 Respect and opaqueness
2.7 A different proposal
2.8 Summary
Chapter 3. Luck
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Different kinds of luck
3.3 Thin luck
3.4 Thick luck
3.5 Independent notions of luck
3.6 How much luck is there?
3.7 Constitutive luck
3.8 Option luck versus brute luck
3.9 Neutralizing luck and equality
3.10 Bad luck versus good luck
3.11 Summary
Chapter 4. Equality of what?
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Welfare
4.3 The specification objection
4.4 The disability objection
4.5 The offensive preference objection
4.6 The experience and snobbish tastes objection
4.7 The non-instrumental concern objection
4.8 Dworkin's resourcist view
4.9 Sen's capability metric
4.10 Summary
Chapter 5. Telic and deontic luck egalitarianism
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Some distinctions
5.3 Telic versus deontic and the scope of equality
5.4 The levelling down objection
5.5 Telic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection
5.6 Deontic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection
5.7 Egalitarian responses
5.8 Summary
Chapter 6. The scope of luck egalitarianism
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Whole lives
6.3 Generations
6.4 Groups
6.5 States
6.6 Individuals who are neither persons nor human beings
6.7 Summary
Chapter 7. Social relations egalitarianism versus luck egalitarianism
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Social relations egalitarianism
7.3 Anderson's democratic equality
7.4 Humiliation and harshness
7.5 What is at stake?
7.6 The source of the disagreement between social relations and luck egalitarians?
7.7 Summary
Chapter 8. Other values
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Freedom
8.3 Demandingness
8.4 Community
8.5 Publicity and stability
8.6 Reflections
8.7 Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
1.1 Introduction
1.2 What is luck egalitarianism?
1.3 What is attractive about luck egalitarianism?
1.4 Three important luck egalitarians: Dworkin
1.5 Three important luck egalitarians: Arneson
1.6 Three important luck egalitarians: Cohen
1.7 Other distributive views
1.8 Summary
Chapter 2. Why equality?
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Formal equality
2.3 Equality of human beings
2.4 Williams on the idea of equality
2.5 Rawls on range properties
2.6 Respect and opaqueness
2.7 A different proposal
2.8 Summary
Chapter 3. Luck
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Different kinds of luck
3.3 Thin luck
3.4 Thick luck
3.5 Independent notions of luck
3.6 How much luck is there?
3.7 Constitutive luck
3.8 Option luck versus brute luck
3.9 Neutralizing luck and equality
3.10 Bad luck versus good luck
3.11 Summary
Chapter 4. Equality of what?
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Welfare
4.3 The specification objection
4.4 The disability objection
4.5 The offensive preference objection
4.6 The experience and snobbish tastes objection
4.7 The non-instrumental concern objection
4.8 Dworkin's resourcist view
4.9 Sen's capability metric
4.10 Summary
Chapter 5. Telic and deontic luck egalitarianism
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Some distinctions
5.3 Telic versus deontic and the scope of equality
5.4 The levelling down objection
5.5 Telic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection
5.6 Deontic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection
5.7 Egalitarian responses
5.8 Summary
Chapter 6. The scope of luck egalitarianism
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Whole lives
6.3 Generations
6.4 Groups
6.5 States
6.6 Individuals who are neither persons nor human beings
6.7 Summary
Chapter 7. Social relations egalitarianism versus luck egalitarianism
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Social relations egalitarianism
7.3 Anderson's democratic equality
7.4 Humiliation and harshness
7.5 What is at stake?
7.6 The source of the disagreement between social relations and luck egalitarians?
7.7 Summary
Chapter 8. Other values
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Freedom
8.3 Demandingness
8.4 Community
8.5 Publicity and stability
8.6 Reflections
8.7 Conclusion
Bibliography
Index