Bargaining with Incomplete Information
Published on 1. January 1992
Book
Hardback
557 pages
978-0-12-451050-0 (ISBN)
Description
This book is a reprinting of the June 1989 issue of the "Journal of Economic Theory". Ten additional papers have been included to expand coverage of current research and provide a convenient source for classic articles. Together these 22 contributions to the economic theory of non-co-operative bargaining show how incomplete information, small numbers of agents, and the rules governing negotiation interact to cause inefficiency, indeterminacy, and delay in bargaining outcomes.
This book is a reprinting of the June 1989 issue of the "Journal of Economic Theory". Ten additional papers have been included to expand coverage of current research and provide a convenient source for classic articles. Together these 22 contributions to the economic theory of non-co-operative bargaining show how incomplete information, small numbers of agents, and the rules governing negotiation interact to cause inefficiency, indeterminacy, and delay in bargaining outcomes.
This book is a reprinting of the June 1989 issue of the "Journal of Economic Theory". Ten additional papers have been included to expand coverage of current research and provide a convenient source for classic articles. Together these 22 contributions to the economic theory of non-co-operative bargaining show how incomplete information, small numbers of agents, and the rules governing negotiation interact to cause inefficiency, indeterminacy, and delay in bargaining outcomes.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
San Diego
United States
Publishing group
Elsevier Science Publishing Co Inc
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 230 mm
Weight
932 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-12-451050-0 (9780124510500)
Copyright in bibliographic data is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or its licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Persons
Content
Bargaining under incomplete information, K. Chatterjee and W. Samuelson; efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading, R. Myerson and M.A. Satterthwaite; ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade, T. Gresik; the efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions, T. Gresik; equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information, W. Leininger, et al; bilateral trade with the sealed-bid k-double auction - existence and efficiency, M.A. Satterthwaite and S. Williams; the bilateral monopoly model - approaching certainty under the split-the-difference mechanism, E. Broman; the sealed-bid mechanism - an experimental study, R. Radner and A. Schotter; minimax-regret strategies for bargaining over several variables, P.B. Linhart and R. Radner; a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences, A. Rubinstein; foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture, F. Gul, et al; reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly, L. Ausubel and R. Deneckere; strategic delay in bargaining, A. Admati and M. Perry; a direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information, L. Ausubel and R. Deneckere; bargaining with common values, D. Vincent; cheap talk can matter in bargaining, J. Farrell and R. Gibbons; pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions, S. Matthews and A. Postlewaite; credible negotiation statements and coherent plans, R. Myerson; the rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases - an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms, T. Gresik and M.A. Satterthwaite; the rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction as the market becomes large, M.A. Satterthwaite and S. Williams; pollution claim settlements under private information, R. Rob.