Power and Legitimacy
Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State
1st Edition
Published on 30. September 2010
Book
Hardback
364 pages
978-0-19-539014-8 (ISBN)
Description
The implications of European integration for national democracy and constitutionalism are well known. Nevertheless, as the events of the last decade made clear, the EU's complex system of governance has been unable to achieve a democratic or constitutional legitimacy in its own right. In Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State, Peter L. Lindseth traces the roots of this paradox to integration's dependence on the postwar constitutional settlement of administrative governance on the national level.
Supranational policymaking has relied on various forms of oversight from national constitutional bodies, following models that were first developed in the administrative state and then translated into the European context. These national oversight mechanisms (executive, legislative, and judicial) have over the last half-century developed to address the central disconnect in the integration process: between the need for supranational regulatory power, on the one hand, and the persistence of national constitutional legitimacy, on the other. In defining the ways European public law has sought to reconcile these two conflicting demands, Professor Lindseth lays the foundation for a better understanding of the "administrative, not constitutional" nature of European governance going forward.
Supranational policymaking has relied on various forms of oversight from national constitutional bodies, following models that were first developed in the administrative state and then translated into the European context. These national oversight mechanisms (executive, legislative, and judicial) have over the last half-century developed to address the central disconnect in the integration process: between the need for supranational regulatory power, on the one hand, and the persistence of national constitutional legitimacy, on the other. In defining the ways European public law has sought to reconcile these two conflicting demands, Professor Lindseth lays the foundation for a better understanding of the "administrative, not constitutional" nature of European governance going forward.
Reviews / Votes
...this book is a major contribution to the history of European integration...a major accomplishment of historical literature, well written, original and though provoking. This is simply mandatory reading for any scholar of European integration history. * Morten Rasmussen, University of Copenhagen *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
New York
United States
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Lawyers, judges, scholars, and politicians
Dimensions
Height: 240 mm
Width: 161 mm
Thickness: 24 mm
Weight
708 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-539014-8 (9780195390148)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
E-Book
09/2010
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€63.49
Available for download
Person
Peter L. Lindseth is the Olimpiad S. Ioffe Professor of International and Comparative Law at the University of Connecticut School of Law. He has previously taught at Yale, Princeton, and Columbia, and has also held fellowships at the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History (Frankfurt), the European University Institute (Florence), and the French Council of State (Paris), among other institutions. Professor Lindseth holds a BA and JD from Cornell and a PhD in European history from Columbia.
Content
Preface
Citation Forms
Abbreviations
Introduction: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State
Representative Government, Democratic Legitimacy, and "Europe"
Administrative Governance and the Distinction between Control and Legitimation of Regulatory Power
National Legitimation and the Administrative Character of European Governance
1 Situating the Argument: Legal History, Institutional Change, and Integration Theory
1.1 Administrative Governance as an Alternative Analytical Framework
1.2 Delegation as a Normative-Legal Principle
1.3 The Importance of National Antecedents
2 The Interwar Crisis and the Postwar Constitutional Settlement of Administrative Governance
2.1 The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy and Lessons Learned
2.2 Elements of the Postwar Constitutional Settlement
Delegation and the Legislative Function Redefined
Technocracy and the Leadership of the National Executive
Courts as Commitment Mechanisms: Collective Democracy and Individual Rights
2.3 Mediated Legitimacy and the Conditions for Constitutional Stability in the Two Postwar Eras
3 Supranational Delegation and National Executive Leadership since the 1950s
3.1 A "New Deal" for Europe?: Technocratic Autonomy, the Treaty of Paris, and a National Executive Role
3.2 Toward National Executive Control?: Negotiating the Treaty of Rome
3.3 From Control to Oversight: the Luxembourg Compromise, the European Council, and Beyond
4 Supranational Delegation and National Judicial Review since the 1960s
4.1 The European Court of Justice and Judicially Sanctioned "Spill-over"
4.2 Defining National Judicial Deference to Supranational Delegation, 1960s-1980s
4.3 Defining the Limits of Strong Deference: Kompetenz-Kompetenz in the Constitutional Politics and Jurisprudence of the Last Two Decades
5 Supranational Delegation and National Parliamentary Scrutiny since the 1970s
5.1 The Pivotal Change: Subsidiarity and the Expansion of Supranational Regulatory Power after 1986
5.2 The Institutionalization of National Parliamentary Scrutiny under National Law since the 1970s
5.3 Toward a "Polycentric" Constitutional Settlement: National Parliaments and Subsidiarity under Supranational Law in the 2000s
Conclusion: The Challenge of Legitimizing "Europeanized" Administrative Governance
Beyond Delegation?: Density, Democracy, and Polycentric Constitutionalism
Legitimation and Control Revisited: Toward a European Conflicts Tribunal?
Sovereignty, the Nation-State, and Integration History
Bibliography
Citation Forms
Abbreviations
Introduction: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State
Representative Government, Democratic Legitimacy, and "Europe"
Administrative Governance and the Distinction between Control and Legitimation of Regulatory Power
National Legitimation and the Administrative Character of European Governance
1 Situating the Argument: Legal History, Institutional Change, and Integration Theory
1.1 Administrative Governance as an Alternative Analytical Framework
1.2 Delegation as a Normative-Legal Principle
1.3 The Importance of National Antecedents
2 The Interwar Crisis and the Postwar Constitutional Settlement of Administrative Governance
2.1 The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy and Lessons Learned
2.2 Elements of the Postwar Constitutional Settlement
Delegation and the Legislative Function Redefined
Technocracy and the Leadership of the National Executive
Courts as Commitment Mechanisms: Collective Democracy and Individual Rights
2.3 Mediated Legitimacy and the Conditions for Constitutional Stability in the Two Postwar Eras
3 Supranational Delegation and National Executive Leadership since the 1950s
3.1 A "New Deal" for Europe?: Technocratic Autonomy, the Treaty of Paris, and a National Executive Role
3.2 Toward National Executive Control?: Negotiating the Treaty of Rome
3.3 From Control to Oversight: the Luxembourg Compromise, the European Council, and Beyond
4 Supranational Delegation and National Judicial Review since the 1960s
4.1 The European Court of Justice and Judicially Sanctioned "Spill-over"
4.2 Defining National Judicial Deference to Supranational Delegation, 1960s-1980s
4.3 Defining the Limits of Strong Deference: Kompetenz-Kompetenz in the Constitutional Politics and Jurisprudence of the Last Two Decades
5 Supranational Delegation and National Parliamentary Scrutiny since the 1970s
5.1 The Pivotal Change: Subsidiarity and the Expansion of Supranational Regulatory Power after 1986
5.2 The Institutionalization of National Parliamentary Scrutiny under National Law since the 1970s
5.3 Toward a "Polycentric" Constitutional Settlement: National Parliaments and Subsidiarity under Supranational Law in the 2000s
Conclusion: The Challenge of Legitimizing "Europeanized" Administrative Governance
Beyond Delegation?: Density, Democracy, and Polycentric Constitutionalism
Legitimation and Control Revisited: Toward a European Conflicts Tribunal?
Sovereignty, the Nation-State, and Integration History
Bibliography