
Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market
Springer (Publisher)
Published on 16. June 2014
Book
Paperback/Softback
XIII, 81 pages
978-3-319-06798-8 (ISBN)
Description
This Brief introduces the wireless spectrum market and discusses the current research for spectrum auctions. It covers the unique properties of spectrum auction, such as interference relationship, reusability, divisibility, composite effect and marginal effect, while also proposing how to build economic incentives into the network architecture and protocols in order to optimize the efficiency of wireless systems.
Three scenarios for designing new auctions are demonstrated. First, a truthful double auction scheme for spectrum trading considering both the heterogeneous propagation properties of channels and spatial reuse is proposed. In the second scenario, a framework is designed to enable spectrum group secondary users with a limited budget. Finally, a flexible auction is created enabling operators to purchase the right amounts of spectrum at the right prices according to their users' dynamic demands.
Both concise and comprehensive, Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market is suited for professionals and researchers working with wireless communications and networks. It is also a useful tool for advanced-level students interested in spectrum and networking issues.
More details
Series
Edition
2014 ed.
Language
English
Place of publication
Cham
Switzerland
Publishing group
Springer International Publishing
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Research
Illustrations
18 s/w Abbildungen
XIII, 81 p. 18 illus.
Dimensions
Height: 235 mm
Width: 155 mm
Thickness: 6 mm
Weight
160 gr
ISBN-13
978-3-319-06798-8 (9783319067988)
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-06799-5
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

Peng Lin | Xiaojun Feng | Qian Zhang
Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market
E-Book
05/2014
1st Edition
Springer
€53.49
Available for download
Content
Introduction.- Auction Mechanisms.- Truthful Double Auction Mechanism for Heterogeneous Spectrums.- Spectrum Group-buying Framework.- Flexauc Auction: Serving Dynamic Demand in Wireless Markets.- Conclusions.