Dictators and Democracy in African Development
The Political Economy of Good Governance in Nigeria
Published on 28. July 2016
Book
Paperback/Softback
308 pages
978-1-107-44095-1 (ISBN)
Description
What are the conditions for good governance in Africa, and why do many democracies still struggle with persistent poverty? Drawing on a historical study of Nigeria since independence, this book argues that the structure of the policy-making process explains variations in government performance better than other commonly cited factors, such as oil, colonialism, ethnic diversity, foreign debt, and dictatorships. The author links the political structure of the policy process to patterns of government performance over half a century to show that the key factor is not simply the status of the regime as a dictatorship or a democracy, but rather it is the structure of the policy-making process by which different policy demands are included or excluded. By identifying political actors with the leverage to prevent policy change and extract concessions, empirical tests demonstrate how these 'veto players' systematically affect the performance of two broad categories of public policy. This Madisonian dilemma has important implications for African countries struggling with the institutional trade-offs presented by different regimes.
Reviews / Votes
'... while LeVVan's original, sophisticated and dense study will mostly appeal to postgraduate students and established scholars researching Nigeria, it also has much to offer those working in the fields of democratisation and comparative politics. This is an important and commendable book.' J. N. C. Hill, The Journal of Modern African Studies 'Dictators and Democracy in African Development merits much praise for its concentration on veto players, which augments a critical new component to scholars' understanding of the political economy of third world countries.' Enock Ndawana, DemocratizationMore details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
Paperback (trade)
Illustrations
7 Tables, unspecified; 4 Line drawings, black and white
Dimensions
Height: 229 mm
Width: 152 mm
Thickness: 19 mm
Weight
503 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-107-44095-1 (9781107440951)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
A. Carl Levan
Dictators and Democracy in African Development
The Political Economy of Good Governance in Nigeria
Book
11/2014
Cambridge University Press
€124.90
Shipment within 15-20 days
A. Carl Levan
Dictators and Democracy in African Development
The Political Economy of Good Governance in Nigeria
E-Book
11/2014
1st Edition
Cambridge University Press
€23.49
Available for download
Person
A. Carl LeVan is an Assistant Professor in the School of International Service at American University, Washington DC. His research focuses on political institutions, democratization, and African security. His essays on power-sharing in East Africa, civil society in Nigeria, Boko Haram, comparative authoritarianism, and the US military's Africa Command have appeared in journals such as Governance, Africa Today, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, and the Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding. His article, 'Questioning Tocqueville in Africa', won the Frank Cass Award for Best Article in 2011 on Democratization by a Young Scholar. Recent collaborative essays examine property rights and migration in Abuja and the economic impact of cabinet size. A new collaborative project with Professor Todd Eisenstadt examines the democratizing effects of participatory constitution-making around the world. Prior to receiving his PhD in Political Science from the University of California, San Diego, he worked in the US Congress, and then served as a technical advisor to Nigeria's National Assembly. Follow him on twitter at https://twitter.com/Dev4Security.
Content
Introduction; 1. A theory of institutions, preferences, and performance; 2. Veto players in Nigeria's political history since independence; 3. The impact of Nigeria's veto players on local and national collective goods; 4. Analytic equivalents in Ghana and Zimbabwe; 5. Madison's model unbound.