Reasoning and Decision Making
Blackwell Publishers
Published on 30. May 1994
Book
Paperback/Softback
208 pages
978-1-55786-601-1 (ISBN)
Description
This volume brings together two separate aspects of the psychology of thinking: how people reason; and how they make judgements and decisions. These aspects are often interwoven in real life, so students of decision-making are increasingly examining the role of reasoning in the construction of preferences in reasoning. Also, research in the two domains has revealed a striking parallel: human thinkers make radical departures from the canons of rationality - from formal logic in the case of reasoning, and from expected utility theory in the case of decision-making. These two departures have forced social scientists to think again about the nature of human mentality. The chapters in this book cover the nature of rationality, how individuals construct reasons for choices, how they are led astray by focusing on only certain aspects of situations, how they assess the strength of inductions, how they reach decisions on juries and how their performance can be improved. "Reasoning and Decision Making" should be of interest to advanced undergraduates and beyond, and to psychologists, decision theorists and philosophers.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Publishing group
John Wiley and Sons Ltd
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
indices
Dimensions
Height: 229 mm
Width: 152 mm
Weight
339 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-55786-601-1 (9781557866011)
Copyright in bibliographic data is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or its licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Persons
Content
1. The interaction between reasoning and decision-making: P.N. Johnson-Laird and Eldar Shafir (both of Princeton University). 2. Reason-based choice: Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson and Amos Tversky (Princeton University, Stanford University and Stanford University). 3. Focusing in reasoning and decision-making: P. Legrenzi, Vi Girotto and P.N. Johnson-Laird (Universita degli Studi di Trieste, Universita degli Studi di Trieste and Princeton University). 4. Similarity, plausibility and judgements of probability: Edward Smith, Eldar Shafir and Daniel Osherson (University of Michigan, Princeton University and IDIAP, Switzerland). 5. De-bias the environment instead of the judge: an alternative approach to reducing error in diagnostic judgement: Joshua Klayman and Kaye Brown (University of Chicago and National Center for Health Program Evaluation, Australia). 6. Reasoning in explanation-based decision-making: Nancy Pennington and Reid Haste (both at University of Colorado). 7. Reasoning, decision-making and rationality: Jonathan St B.T. Evans, D.E. Over and K.I. Manktelow (University of Plymouth, University of Sunderland and University of Wolverhampton).