Understanding Philosophy of Science

Introduction

Section I: The Scientific Method

Chapter 1: Induction

1.1 The Sceptic's Challenge 1.2 The Scientific Revolution 1.3 The 'New Tool' of Induction

1.4 Naive Inductivism

Chapter 2: Problems of Observation and Induction

2.1 The Problem of Induction 2.2 Solutions and Dissolutions of the Problem of Induction

2.3 Inductivism and the History of Science 2.4 Theory and Observation 2.5 Conclusion

Chapter 3: Falsificationism

3.1 Popper and the Critique of Marxism and Psychoanalysis 3.2 Popper's 'Solution' to the Problem of Induction 3.3 The Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification 3.4 The Duhem Problem 3.5 Problems with Falsificationism 3.6 Sophisticated Inductivism

Chapter 4: Revolutions and Rationality

4.1 The Received View of Science 4.2 Kuhn's Revolutionary History of Science

4.3 Paradigms and Normal Science 4.4 The Copernican Revolution 4.5 Theory and Observation

4.6 Incommensurabilty 4.7 Post-Kuhnian views of the scientific method 4.8 Relativism, reason and the science wars 4.9 Science, History and society

Section II: Realism and Antirealism about Science

Chapter 5: Scientific Realism

5.1 Appearance and Reality 5.2 The Metaphysics of the External World 5.2.1 Realism and Ideaism

5.2.2 Idealism 5.3 Semantics 5.3.1 Logical Positivism 5.3.2 Semantic Instrumentalism and Reductive Empiricism 5.3.3 Truth 5.4 Standard Scientific Realism 5.5 Antirealism

Chapter 6: Underdetermination

6.1 Underdetermination 6.1.1 Weak Underdetermination 6.1.2 Strong Underdetermination

6.1.3 The Duhem-Quine Thesis 6.1.4 Responses to the Underdetermination Argument

6.2 Constructive Empiricism 6.2.1 Objections to Constructive Empiricism 6.2.1.1 The Observable and Unobservable 6.2.1.2 Acceptance and Belief 6.2.1.3 Selective Scepticism?

Chapter 7: Explanation and Inference to the Best Explanation

7.1 Explanation 7.1.1 The Covering Law Model of Explanation

7.1.1.1 The Deductive-Nomological Model 7.1.1.2 The Inductive Statistical Model 7.1.1.3 Problems with the Covering-Law account 7.1.2 Other Theories of Explanation 7.2 Inference to the Best Explanation

7.2.1 The Local Defence of Scientific Realism 7.2.2 The Global Defence of Realism 7.2.3 Van Fraassen's Critique of Inference to the Best Explanation 7.3 Common Sense, Realism and Constructive Empiricism

Chapter 8: Confirmation and Evidence

8.1 Nicod's criterion and Hempel's symmetry thesis 8.2 The paradoxes of confirmation 8.3 Bayesianism

8.4 Evidence and Time

Chapter 9: Realism About What?

9.1 Theory Change 9.1.1 Approximate Truth 9.1.2 Sense and Reference 9.1.3 The Pessimistic Meta-Induction 9.1.3.1 Realist Responses 9.1.3.2 Novelty 9.1.4 Counterexamples to the No-Miracles Argument 9.1.4.1 Realist Responses to the Counterexamples 9.2 Multiple Models 9.3 Idealisation 9.4 Structural Realism

Bibliography

Glossary