
Treaty Politics and the Rise of Executive Agreements
International Commitments in a System of Shared Powers
The University of Michigan Press
Published on 1. June 2009
Book
Hardback
320 pages
978-0-472-11687-4 (ISBN)
Description
Executive agreements offer both the president and Congress a more efficient way to conduct international affairs. The expansion of executive power has been referred to pejoratively as the rise of the 'imperial presidency'. In foreign relations, presidents have exercised a growing independence through the use of executive agreements. The U.S. Constitution specifies that two-thirds of the Senate must ratify a proposed treaty and makes no provision for other forms of international agreements. In 1942, however, the Supreme Court affirmed the legality of executive agreements; and since WWII, they have outnumbered treaties by more than ten to one.Are presidents trampling the Constitution or seeking to streamline the diplomatic process? Glen S. Krutz and Jeffrey S. Peake argue that the preference for executive agreements is the result of a symbiotic evolution of the executive and the legislative branches. In order for the United States to survive in a complex, ever-changing global environment and maintain its world power status, it must complete international commitments swiftly and confidently.
Members of Congress concur that executive agreements allow each branch to function more effectively. At the same time, the House continues to oversee particular policy areas; and presidents still submit the majority of the most significant international commitments to the Senate as treaties. Rather than an assault on the balance of power, Krutz and Peake conclude, executive agreements represent a mutual adaptation of the executive and the legislature in a system of shared power.
Members of Congress concur that executive agreements allow each branch to function more effectively. At the same time, the House continues to oversee particular policy areas; and presidents still submit the majority of the most significant international commitments to the Senate as treaties. Rather than an assault on the balance of power, Krutz and Peake conclude, executive agreements represent a mutual adaptation of the executive and the legislature in a system of shared power.
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Ann Arbor
United States
Target group
College/higher education
Illustrations
7 figures, 12 tables
Dimensions
Height: 229 mm
Width: 152 mm
ISBN-13
978-0-472-11687-4 (9780472116874)
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Schweitzer Classification
Persons
Glen S. Krutz is Associate Director of the Carl Albert Center and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma. Jeffrey S. Peake is Associate Professor of Political Science at Bowling Green State University.