Auction Theory
2nd Edition
Published on 28. September 2009
Book
Hardback
336 pages
978-0-12-374507-1 (ISBN)
Description
Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna's ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions.
Reviews / Votes
"Krishna's superb Auction Theory is an ideal text and reference because his clear and precise exposition distills the vast literature and provides excellent motivation, examples, exercises, and connections to commercial applications." --Robert B. Wilson, Stanford University"On its publication in 2002, Vijay Krishna's book immediately became a central reference in auction theory. But the subject has continued to develop, and so we're very fortunate that Krishna has now updated the text." --Eric Maskin, Institute for Advanced Study, Nobel Laureate in Economics
More details
Edition
2nd edition
Language
English
Place of publication
San Diego
United States
Publishing group
Elsevier Science Publishing Co Inc
Target group
College/higher education
Graduate students and professors working in finance, economics, and industrial organization, and professionals learning about or developing auctions, either in a university setting or in industry.
Product notice
Laminated cover
Dimensions
Height: 241 mm
Width: 164 mm
Thickness: 27 mm
Weight
647 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-12-374507-1 (9780123745071)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Krishna | Vijay Krishna
Auction Theory
E-Book
05/2014
2nd Edition
Academic Press
€62.95
Available for download
Previous edition
Person
Content
I Single Object Auctions
Private Value Auctions
The Revenue Equivalence Principle
Qualifications and Extensions
Mechanism Design
Auctions with Interdependent Values
The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle
Asymmetries and Other Complications
Efficiency and the English Auction
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
Bidding Rings
II Multiple Object Auctions
An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions
Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values
Some Revenue Considerations
Sequential Sales
Nonidentical Objects
Packages and Positions
Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values
III Appendices
Continuous Distributions
Stochastic Orders
Order Statistics
Affiliated Random Variables
Some Linear Algebra
Private Value Auctions
The Revenue Equivalence Principle
Qualifications and Extensions
Mechanism Design
Auctions with Interdependent Values
The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle
Asymmetries and Other Complications
Efficiency and the English Auction
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
Bidding Rings
II Multiple Object Auctions
An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions
Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values
Some Revenue Considerations
Sequential Sales
Nonidentical Objects
Packages and Positions
Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values
III Appendices
Continuous Distributions
Stochastic Orders
Order Statistics
Affiliated Random Variables
Some Linear Algebra