Microeconomic Foundations II
Imperfect Competition, Information, and Strategic Interaction
Published on 23. May 2023
Book
Hardback
800 pages
978-0-691-25014-4 (ISBN)
Description
A cutting-edge introduction to key topics in modern economic theory for first-year graduate students in economics and related fields
Volume II of Microeconomic Foundations introduces models and methods at the center of modern microeconomic theory. In this textbook, David Kreps, a leading economic theorist, emphasizes foundational material, concentrating on seminal work that provides perspective on how and why the theory developed. Because noncooperative game theory is the chief tool of modeling and analyzing microeconomic phenomena, the book stresses the applications of game theory to economics. And throughout, it underscores why theory is most useful when it supports rather than supplants economic intuition.
Introduces first-year graduate students to the models and methods at the core of microeconomic theory today
Covers an extensive range of topics, including the agency theory, market signaling, relational contracting, bilateral bargaining, auctions, matching markets, and mechanism design
Stresses the use-and misuse-of theory in studying economic phenomena and shows why theory should support, not replace, economic intuition
Includes extensive appendices reviewing the essential concepts of noncooperative game theory, with guidance about how it should and shouldn't be used
Features free online supplements, including chapter outlines and overviews, solutions to all the problems in the book, and more
Volume II of Microeconomic Foundations introduces models and methods at the center of modern microeconomic theory. In this textbook, David Kreps, a leading economic theorist, emphasizes foundational material, concentrating on seminal work that provides perspective on how and why the theory developed. Because noncooperative game theory is the chief tool of modeling and analyzing microeconomic phenomena, the book stresses the applications of game theory to economics. And throughout, it underscores why theory is most useful when it supports rather than supplants economic intuition.
Introduces first-year graduate students to the models and methods at the core of microeconomic theory today
Covers an extensive range of topics, including the agency theory, market signaling, relational contracting, bilateral bargaining, auctions, matching markets, and mechanism design
Stresses the use-and misuse-of theory in studying economic phenomena and shows why theory should support, not replace, economic intuition
Includes extensive appendices reviewing the essential concepts of noncooperative game theory, with guidance about how it should and shouldn't be used
Features free online supplements, including chapter outlines and overviews, solutions to all the problems in the book, and more
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
New Jersey
United States
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
Trade binding
Illustrations
86 b/w illus. 7 tables.
Dimensions
Height: 259 mm
Width: 183 mm
Thickness: 49 mm
Weight
1610 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-691-25014-4 (9780691250144)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
David M. Kreps
Microeconomic Foundations II
Imperfect Competition, Information, and Strategic Interaction
E-Book
01/2023
Lapa Publishers
€68.49
Available for download
Person
David M. Kreps is the Adams Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Management at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business. He is a Distinguished Fellow of the American Economic Association, a fellow of the Econometric Society and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a member of the National Academy of Sciences. His books include Microeconomic Foundations I: Choice and Competitive Markets (Princeton), Microeconomics for Managers (Princeton), The Motivation Toolkit: How to Align Your Employees' Interests with Your Own, and The Black-Scholes-Merton Model as an Idealization of Discrete-Time Economies.