Economics of Federalism

Contents:

Volume I

Acknowledgements

Introduction Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein

PART I BASICS
A Multiple Jurisdictions Are a Solution to the Public Good Problem
1. Charles M. Tiebout (1956), 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures'

B Exit and Federalism
2. Richard A. Epstein (1992), 'Exit Rights Under Federalism'

C Optimal Jurisdiction Size
3. Gordon Tullock (1969), 'Federalism: Problems of Scale'

D Twin Dilemmas of Federalism: Free Riding, Spillovers, and Agency Costs
4. William H. Riker (1964), 'The Origin and Purposes of Federalism' and 'The Maintenance of Federalism: The Administrative Theory'

E Conditions for Federalism
5. Edmund W. Kitch (1980), 'Regulation and the American Common Market'

F Public Choice and Federalism
6. Jonathan R. Macey (1990), 'Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism'

PART II FISCAL FEDERALISM AND THE OPTIMAL STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
A Tests of the Tiebout Model
7. Edward M. Gramlich and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1982), 'Micro Estimates of Public Spending Demand Functions and Tests of the Tiebout and Median-Voter Hypotheses'
8. Paul W. Rhode and Koleman S. Strumpf (2003), 'Assessing the Importance of Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990'

B Does Structure Matter?
9. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1981), 'Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic'
10. Dennis Epple and Alan Zelentiz (1981), 'The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?'

C Vertical and Horizontal Competition
11. Albert Breton (1996), 'A Retrospective Overview' and 'The Organization of Governmental Systems'

D Federalism, Development, and Self-Enforcing Federalism
12. Barry R. Weingast (1995), 'The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development'

E Cooperative Federalism
13. Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1997), 'Rethinking Federalism'

F Optimal Taxation and Fiscal Instruments and Intergovernmental Grants
14. Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1996), 'Designing Tax Policy in Federalist Economies: An Overview'

G Leviathan and the Size of Government
15. Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan (1980), 'Open Economy, Federalism, and Taxing Authority'
16. Jonathan Rodden (2003), 'Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government'

H Distribution
17. John Donahue (1997), 'Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America's Devolution Debate'
18. Dennis Epple and Thomas Romer (1991), 'Mobility and Redistribution'
Name Index

Volume II

Acknowledgements

An introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume I

PART I LAW
A Commerce Clause
1. Saul Levmore (1983), 'Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention'

B Uniform State Laws
2. Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi (1996), 'An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws'

C The Choice of State Versus Federal Law
3. William F. Baxter (1963), 'Choice of Law and the Federal System'

D Contractual Choice of Law and Forum
4. Erin O'Hara and Larry E. Ribstein (2000), 'From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law'

PART II SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS
A Corporate Law and the Race to the Top
5. Roberta Romano (1985), 'Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle'
6. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk (1992), 'Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law'

B Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism
7. Frank H. Easterbrook (1983), 'Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism'

C Environmental Regulation
8. Richard L. Revesz (2001), 'Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis'

D Taxation
9. Daniel Shaviro (1992), 'An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation'

E Welfare Reform
10. Charles C. Brown and Wallace E. Oates (1987), 'Assistance to the Poor in a Federal System'

F Crime
11. Doron Teichman (2005), 'The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional Competition'

Name Index