Problems in Historical Epistemology
Published on 12. October 2011
Book
Paperback/Softback
194 pages
978-94-010-7136-9 (ISBN)
Description
It was only after I had finished this volume that I came across the book by Barry Bames, Scientific Knowledge and Sociologi- cal Theory (Routledge and Kegan Paul). I am in full ag,reement with certain ideas expounded in that book, although it also contains others that I must object to. I have decided to make some remarks about them at the beginning of my book, as I believe that they may prove useful by way of int,roduction to the English version of this volume. I hope that anyone who has professional reasons to turn his attention to this volume will have acquainted himself with Scientific Knowledge and Socio- logical Theory before he proceeds any further. I fully share Barnes' view that it is possible and desirable to undertake descrtptive-sociological investigations of scientific research. The main subjeot of this research should be the na- tural science, and ,moreover, such findings in these sciences whose cognitive value has never been questioned by profession- als. These investigations must avoid becoming entangled in epistemologtical controversies, and through epi:stemo}. ogy in ,phi- losophical controversies.
They must not defend any of the contended theses and must not Hrterally ,rely on evaluative pre- mises that have been questicmed.
They must not defend any of the contended theses and must not Hrterally ,rely on evaluative pre- mises that have been questicmed.
More details
Series
Edition
Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1988
Language
English
Place of publication
Dordrecht
Netherlands
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Research
Illustrations
194 p.
Dimensions
Height: 229 mm
Width: 152 mm
Thickness: 12 mm
Weight
298 gr
ISBN-13
978-94-010-7136-9 (9789401071369)
DOI
10.1007/978-94-009-1421-6
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Book
10/1988
Kluwer Academic Publishers
€97.50
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Persons
Content
1 / Epistemological Cognition as Historical Cognition.- 1.1. Factographical Versus Theoretical Historicism.- 1.2. Framework Regularities.- 1.3. Assumptions of Historical Epistemology.- 1.4. The Relation Born by General Statements of Historical Epistemology on Methodological Norms and Directives.- Notes.- 2 / The Relation of Correspondence.- 2.1. Literal Reference.- 2.2. The Characteristics of Essentially Corrective (Strict) Correspondence.- 2.3. Remarks of Traditional Understandings of Correspondence.- 2.4. An Example of Essentially Corrective Correspondence, A Debate with the Views of P. K. Feyerabend.- Notes.- 3 / The Opposition of Theory and Experience.- 3.1. 'Dogma of Empiricism'.- 3.2. Performed Action as the Essentially Corrected Correspondence Rendering of Undertaken Action.- 3.3 Two Kinds of Opposition of Theory and Experience: The Relative and the Absolute.- Notes.- 4 / The Duhem-Quine Thesis.- 4.1. The Comprehensive Instrumentalism of W. V. Quine.- 4.2. The Comprehensive Instrumentalism of W. V Quine from the Viewpoint of Historical Epistemology.- Notes.- 5 / Althusser's Instrumentalism.- 5.1. A Marxist Variant of Theoretical Historicism Methodology.- 5.2. Althusser's Conception of Historical Materialism.- 5.3. 'Anti-Empiricism' as a Consequence of the 'Methodologically' Instrumentalist Interpretation of Historical Materialism.- Notes.