Regulation versus Litigation
Perspectives from Economics and Law
Will be published approx. on 1. February 2011
Book
Hardback
344 pages
978-0-226-43218-2 (ISBN)
Description
The efficacy of various political institutions is the subject of intense debate between proponents of broad legislative standards enforced through litigation and those who prefer regulation by administrative agencies. This book explores the trade-offs between litigation and regulation, the circumstances in which one approach may outperform the other, and the principles that affect the choice between addressing particular economic activities with one system or the other. Combining theoretical analysis with empirical investigation in a range of industries, including public health, financial markets, medical care, and workplace safety, "Regulation versus Litigation" sheds light on the costs and benefits of two important instruments of economic policy.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Chicago
United States
Publishing group
The University of Chicago Press
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 24 mm
Width: 17 mm
Thickness: 2 mm
Weight
595 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-226-43218-2 (9780226432182)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
E-Book
12/2010
1st Edition
University of Chicago Press
€131.89
Available for download
Person
Daniel P. Kessler is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University; professor of law at Stanford Law School; and a research associate of the NBER.