
Sharing Knowledge
A Functionalist Account of Assertion
Cambridge University Press
Published on 18. November 2021
Book
Hardback
220 pages
978-1-316-51713-0 (ISBN)
Description
Assertion is the central vehicle for the sharing of knowledge. Whether knowledge is shared successfully often depends on the quality of assertions: good assertions lead to successful knowledge sharing, while bad ones don't. In Sharing Knowledge, Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion investigate the relation between knowledge sharing and assertion, and develop an account of what it is to assert well. More specifically, they argue that the function of assertion is to share knowledge with others. It is this function that supports a central norm of assertion according to which a good assertion is one that has the disposition to generate knowledge in others. The book uses this functionalist approach to motivate further norms of assertion on both the speaker and the hearer side and investigates ramifications of this view for other questions about assertion.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
Worked examples or Exercises
Dimensions
Height: 235 mm
Width: 157 mm
Thickness: 17 mm
Weight
476 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-316-51713-0 (9781316517130)
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Schweitzer Classification
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Book
10/2023
Cambridge University Press
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E-Book
11/2021
Cambridge University Press
€79.49
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E-Book
11/2021
Cambridge University Press
€79.49
Available for download
Persons
Christoph Kelp is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. He is author of Inquiry, Knowledge and Understanding (2021) and co-editor of Virtue Theoretic Epistemology (with John Greco, Cambridge, 2020).
Content
Introduction; Part I. KRA: The Knowledge Rule of Assertion: 1. The case for the KRA; 2. Problems for KRA; 3. KRA and sufficiency; Part II. FFAA: A function first account of assertion: 4. FFAA; 5. FFAA and KRA; 6. FFAA and the duty to believe; Part III. Knowledge and Language: 7. KRA and constitutivity; 8. KRA and epistemic contextualism; Appendix A. The value of knowledge; Appendix B. JRA and knowledge first justification; Appendix C. Constitutivity in general; Bibliography.