
Foundations of Organizational Strategy
Michael C. Jensen(Author)
Harvard University Press
Published on 2. March 2001
Book
Paperback/Softback
430 pages
978-0-674-00564-8 (ISBN)
Description
In this volume, Michael Jensen and his collaborators present the foundations of an integrated theory of organizations. The theory assumes that organizations are equilibrium systems that, like markets, can be influenced, but cannot be told what to do; that human beings are rational and self-interested for the most part; and that information is costly to produce and transfer among agents. The theory also treats business organizations as entities existing in a system of markets (including financial, product, labor, and materials markets) that must be considered in the formulation of organizational strategy.
Jensen argues that the cost of transferring information makes it necessary to decentralize some decision rights in organizations and in the economy. This decentralization in turn requires organizations to solve the control problem that results when self-interested persons do not behave as perfect agents.
Capitalist economies solve these control problems through the institution of alienable decision rights. But because organizations must suppress the alienability of decision rights, they must devise substitute mechanisms that perform its functions. Jensen argues that three critical systems, which he calls the organizational rules of the game, are necessary to substitute for alienability in organizations: (1) a system for allocating decision rights among agents in the firm, (2) a system for measuring and evaluating performance in the firm, and (3) a system for rewarding and punishing individuals for their performance. These concepts offer a major competitive advantage for organizations.
Jensen argues that the cost of transferring information makes it necessary to decentralize some decision rights in organizations and in the economy. This decentralization in turn requires organizations to solve the control problem that results when self-interested persons do not behave as perfect agents.
Capitalist economies solve these control problems through the institution of alienable decision rights. But because organizations must suppress the alienability of decision rights, they must devise substitute mechanisms that perform its functions. Jensen argues that three critical systems, which he calls the organizational rules of the game, are necessary to substitute for alienability in organizations: (1) a system for allocating decision rights among agents in the firm, (2) a system for measuring and evaluating performance in the firm, and (3) a system for rewarding and punishing individuals for their performance. These concepts offer a major competitive advantage for organizations.
Reviews / Votes
This is the first time we have had a virtually complete exposition of Jensen's approach to what has become known as 'positivist agency theory' between one set of hard covers. It should thus be extremely welcome to every scholar who wishes to incorporate an agency perspective in his or her work...Jensen's book is a powerful tool in understanding the implications of this. -- Arthur Francis * Times Higher Education Supplement * A lively collection of a dozen essays spanning over twenty years of original thinking and outstanding scholarship by one of Harvard's foremost professors. Jensen attacks such diverse issues as the nature of man, the theory of the firm, residual claims and organizational form, agency costs, executive compensation, and organizational performance measurement...[This book] is a collection of insightful concepts drawn from years of teaching and research. It is a coherent, orderly, economic explanation of how and why firms organize and the challenges inherent in small and large businesses. In Foundations of Organizational Strategy, Jensen opens the 'black box' of the organization and provides a coherent and logical framework for understanding how and why organizations develop and operate in the market. His attempt succeeds admirably and will reward the reader with not only concepts and models of theoretical organizational behavior but also keen insight applicable in day-to-day organizational endeavors. -- Edward J. Smith * Business Economics *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge, Mass
United States
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
16 line illustrations, 26 tables
Dimensions
Height: 235 mm
Width: 156 mm
Weight
590 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-674-00564-8 (9780674005648)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Person
Michael C. Jensen is Jesse Isidor Straus Professor of Business Administration, Emeritus, Harvard Business School.
Content
Preface Introduction I. Fundamental Building Blocks of the Theory 1. The Nature of Man 2. Self-Interest, Altruism, Incentives, and Agency Theory 3. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure 4. Specific and General Knowledge and Organizational Structure 5. Organization Theory and Methodology II. Residual Claims and Organizational Forms 6. Agency Problems and Residual Claims 7. Separation of Ownership and Control III. Compensation 8. Compensation and Incentives: Practice versus Theory 9. Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives 10. CEO Incentives: It's Not How Much You Pay, But How IV. Organizational Applications of the Theory 11. Science, Specific Knowledge, and Total Quality Management 12. Divisional Performance Measurement Notes References Acknowledgments Index