Human Mentalizing: Its Scope and Limits
Pierre Jacob(Author)
Oxford University Press
Will be published approx. on 23. July 2026
Book
Hardback
336 pages
978-0-19-890126-6 (ISBN)
Description
The main function of mentalizing is to provide human adults with intuitive higher-order beliefs about others' mental states. Behavioral evidence for false-belief attribution has been widely regarded as the hallmark of an attributor's mentalistic expectations about an agent's instrumental action. As it turns out, the developmental investigation of children's capacity to attribute false beliefs to others has yielded discrepant findings. While preschoolers have been shown to fail verbal false-belief tasks, findings based on non-verbal tests suggests that preverbal infants expect an agent to act in accordance with the content of her belief. Why? This volume addresses this experimental discrepancy by offering a pragmatic explanation of the failure of preschoolers on verbal false-belief tasks. Further findings also show that preverbal infants appropriately respond to the presence of ostensive cues whereby the agent of a non-verbal communicative action (pointing, for example) provides them with evidence of her communicative intention. Overall, the developmental evidence calls for a biological phylogenetic account of the human capacity to mentalize: human children could not be taught to mentalize by knowledgeable adults unless they could already mentalize. Rather, the evolutionary ancestors of current human infants were selected for their capacity to mentalize.
Human Mentalizing: Its Scope and Limits also explores the complex relationship between the human capacity to mentalize and the human capacity to attribute reasons to self or others for the purpose of explaining or justifying one's own or another's thoughts or actions. An objective reason is not a mental state: it is a fact that supports an epistemic or a practical conclusion. The book argues that a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for the phylogenetic and ontogenetic emergence of the capacity for reason-attribution is the human capacity for verbal communicative interactions, i.e. the capacity for interactive mentalizing.
Human Mentalizing: Its Scope and Limits also explores the complex relationship between the human capacity to mentalize and the human capacity to attribute reasons to self or others for the purpose of explaining or justifying one's own or another's thoughts or actions. An objective reason is not a mental state: it is a fact that supports an epistemic or a practical conclusion. The book argues that a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for the phylogenetic and ontogenetic emergence of the capacity for reason-attribution is the human capacity for verbal communicative interactions, i.e. the capacity for interactive mentalizing.
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
College/higher education
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Cloth over boards
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 156 mm
ISBN-13
978-0-19-890126-6 (9780198901266)
Copyright in bibliographic data is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or its licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Person
Pierre Jacob is a French philosopher of mind and the cognitive sciences and is Emeritus Director of Research at CNRS. He has been a member of CREA (CNRS and Ecole Polytechnique) and of the Lyon Institute of Cognitive Science created by CNRS in 1998. From 2001 to 2010, he was Head of the Institut Jean Nicod at Ecole Normale Superieure. He contributed to the creation of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy (1991) and has been President-elect of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology (2001-2003). He is a member of Academia Europaea.
Content
- Part I. Philosophical Background
- Chapter 1: Philosophizing About Mentalizing
- Part II. The Evidence from Developmental Psychology
- Chapter 2: Mentalizing Psychologized
- Chapter 3: Reconciling the Discrepant Developmental Findings
- Part III. Mentalizing Without Theorizing
- Chapter 4: Theory-Theory vs Simulation Theory
- Chapter 5: Metapsychological Intuitions
- Part IV. Dual-Process Approaches to Mentalizing
- Chapter 6: The Alluring Appeal of Minimal Mentalizing
- Chapter 7: Is There a Gulf Between Factive and Non-Factive Human Mentalizing?
- Part V. Interactive Mentalizing and Reason-Attribution
- Chapter 8: If Teleology Is the Answer, What Was the Question?
- Chapter 9: How to Change Another's Mind