Rational Animals?
Published on 6. April 2006
Book
Paperback/Softback
568 pages
978-0-19-852827-2 (ISBN)
Description
To what extent can animal behaviour be described as rational? What does it even mean to describe behaviour as rational?
This book focuses on one of the major debates in science today - how closely does mental processing in animals resemble mental processing in humans. It addresses the question of whether and to what extent non-human animals are rational, that is, whether any animal behaviour can be regarded as the result of a rational thought processes. It does this with attention to three key questions, which recur throughout the book and which have both empirical and philosophical aspects: What kinds of behavioural tasks can animals successfully perform? What if any mental processes must be postulated to explain their performance at these tasks? What properties must processes have to count as rational? The book is distinctive in pursuing these questions not only in relation to our closest relatives, the primates, whose intelligence usually gets the most attention, but also in relation to birds and dolphins, where striking results are also being obtained.
Some chapters focus on a particular species. They describe some of the extraordinary and complex behaviour of these species - using tools in novel ways to solve foraging problems, for example, or behaving in novel ways to solve complex social problems - and ask whether such behaviour should be explained in rational or merely mechanistic terms. Other chapters address more theoretical issues and ask, for example, what it means for behaviour to be rational, and whether rationality can be understood in the absence of language.
The book includes many of the world's leading figures doing empirical work on rationality in primates, dolphins, and birds, as well as distinguished philosophers of mind and science. The book includes an editors' introduction which summarises the philosophical and empirical work presented, and draws together the issues discussed by the contributors.
This book focuses on one of the major debates in science today - how closely does mental processing in animals resemble mental processing in humans. It addresses the question of whether and to what extent non-human animals are rational, that is, whether any animal behaviour can be regarded as the result of a rational thought processes. It does this with attention to three key questions, which recur throughout the book and which have both empirical and philosophical aspects: What kinds of behavioural tasks can animals successfully perform? What if any mental processes must be postulated to explain their performance at these tasks? What properties must processes have to count as rational? The book is distinctive in pursuing these questions not only in relation to our closest relatives, the primates, whose intelligence usually gets the most attention, but also in relation to birds and dolphins, where striking results are also being obtained.
Some chapters focus on a particular species. They describe some of the extraordinary and complex behaviour of these species - using tools in novel ways to solve foraging problems, for example, or behaving in novel ways to solve complex social problems - and ask whether such behaviour should be explained in rational or merely mechanistic terms. Other chapters address more theoretical issues and ask, for example, what it means for behaviour to be rational, and whether rationality can be understood in the absence of language.
The book includes many of the world's leading figures doing empirical work on rationality in primates, dolphins, and birds, as well as distinguished philosophers of mind and science. The book includes an editors' introduction which summarises the philosophical and empirical work presented, and draws together the issues discussed by the contributors.
Reviews / Votes
this volume offers a useful overview of current thinking about animal rationality from a variety of academic perspectives. It provides an invaluable point of entry for students new to the area, while offering researchers an insight into the perspectives of those whose approaches to animal rationality are grounded in disciplines other than their own. * Applied Cognitive Psychology, Vol 21 * Rational Animals? is thoughtful, thought-provoking, informative and fascinating and will do a great deal to further interdisciplinary understanding and informed debate. * Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol 13, No 12 * This is an excellent, informative book on animal rationality. * Doody's Notes *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Psychologists and philosophers interested in animal behaviour and animal cognition. Evolutionary psychologists
Illustrations
Figures and tables
Dimensions
Height: 244 mm
Width: 170 mm
Thickness: 31 mm
Weight
971 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-852827-2 (9780198528272)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Persons
Edited by Susan Hurley, University of Warwick and All Souls College, Oxford, UK and Matthew Nudds, Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, UK
Contributors: Elsa Addessi, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Rome, Italy Colin Allen, Dept of History & Philsophy of Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA Jose Luis Bermudez, Philosophy, Neuroscience & Psychology Program, Washington University, St Louis, USA Sarah T Boysen, The Ohio State University, Columbia, USA Josep Call, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany Nicky Clayton, Dept of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, UK Richard Connor, Dept of Biology, University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, USA Gregory Currie, Dept of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, UK Anthony Dickinson, Dept of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, UK Fred I Dretske, Dept of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, USA Nathan Emery, Sub-dept of Animal Behaviour, University of Cambridge, UK William M Fields, Dept of Biology & Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA Louis M Herman, Kewalo Basin Marine Mammal Laboratory, Honolulu, USA Cecilia Heyes, Dept of Psychology, University College London, UK Susan Hurley, Dept of Politics & International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK Alex Kacelnik,Dept of Zoology, University of Oxford, UK Janet Mann, Dept of Psychology, Georgetown University, Washington DC, USA Ruth Garrett Millikan, University of Connecticut, Storrs, USA Matthew Nudds, Dept of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, UK David Papineau, Dept of Philosophy, King's College London, UK Irene M Pepperberg, Dept of Psychology, Brandeis University, Waltham, USA Daniel Povinelli, Cognitive Evolution Group, University of Louisiana, Lafayette, USA Joelle Proust, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris, France Duane M Rumbaugh, Great Ape Trust of Iowa, Des Moines, USA E Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, Dept of Biology & Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA Sara J Shettleworth, Dept of Psychology, University of Toronto, Canada Kim Sterelny, Philosophy Program, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia Jennifer E Sutton, Dept of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, Canada Michael Tomasello, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany Alain J-P C Tschudin, Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge, UK Elisabetta Visalberghi, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Rome, Italy Jennifer Vonk, Cognitive Evolution Group, University of Louisiana, Lafayette, USA
Contributors: Elsa Addessi, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Rome, Italy Colin Allen, Dept of History & Philsophy of Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA Jose Luis Bermudez, Philosophy, Neuroscience & Psychology Program, Washington University, St Louis, USA Sarah T Boysen, The Ohio State University, Columbia, USA Josep Call, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany Nicky Clayton, Dept of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, UK Richard Connor, Dept of Biology, University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, USA Gregory Currie, Dept of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, UK Anthony Dickinson, Dept of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, UK Fred I Dretske, Dept of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, USA Nathan Emery, Sub-dept of Animal Behaviour, University of Cambridge, UK William M Fields, Dept of Biology & Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA Louis M Herman, Kewalo Basin Marine Mammal Laboratory, Honolulu, USA Cecilia Heyes, Dept of Psychology, University College London, UK Susan Hurley, Dept of Politics & International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK Alex Kacelnik,Dept of Zoology, University of Oxford, UK Janet Mann, Dept of Psychology, Georgetown University, Washington DC, USA Ruth Garrett Millikan, University of Connecticut, Storrs, USA Matthew Nudds, Dept of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, UK David Papineau, Dept of Philosophy, King's College London, UK Irene M Pepperberg, Dept of Psychology, Brandeis University, Waltham, USA Daniel Povinelli, Cognitive Evolution Group, University of Louisiana, Lafayette, USA Joelle Proust, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris, France Duane M Rumbaugh, Great Ape Trust of Iowa, Des Moines, USA E Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, Dept of Biology & Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA Sara J Shettleworth, Dept of Psychology, University of Toronto, Canada Kim Sterelny, Philosophy Program, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia Jennifer E Sutton, Dept of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, Canada Michael Tomasello, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany Alain J-P C Tschudin, Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge, UK Elisabetta Visalberghi, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Rome, Italy Jennifer Vonk, Cognitive Evolution Group, University of Louisiana, Lafayette, USA
Content
PART I - TYPES AND LEVELS OF RATIONALITY ; PART II - RATIONAL VERSUS ASSOCIATIVE PROCESSES ; PART III - METACOGNITION ; PART IV - SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND COGNITION ; PART V - MIND READING AND BEHAVIOUR READING ; PART VI - BEHAVIOR AND COGNITION IN SYMBOLIC ENVIRONMENTS