American Factions
How the US Constitution Can End Extreme Partisanship
Published on 14. May 2026
Book
Paperback/Softback
350 pages
978-1-009-76808-5 (ISBN)
Description
Americans of all political stripes are becoming increasingly frustrated with the partisanship of present-day politics. Democrats and Republicans alike claim mandates on narrow margins of victory and are quick to condemn their opponents as enemies of the public good. The Framers of the Constitution understood that such divisions are rooted in the political factions inherent in democracy. Their solutions were federalism, the separation of powers, bicameralism, judicial review and other structural constraints on majority rule. Over the course of US history some of those constraints have been eroded as American politics have become more democratic and less respectful of the liberties and freedoms the Framers sought to protect. American Factions advocates for a renewed understanding of the problem of political factions and a restoration of the Constitution's limits to revive a politics of compromise and bipartisanship.
Reviews / Votes
'A book for our time. A judicious and thoroughly admirable appreciation of the risks and excesses of democracy and the measures needed to curb them.' Owen Fiss, Sterling Professor Emeritus of Law, Yale Law School 'Huffman insightfully examines the causes of political faction or polarization, the constitutional structures that the Framers designed to limit its negative effects, and the gradual erosion of those structures. This book is a powerful reminder that individual liberty is threatened by unconstrained democracy and protected by constitutional checks and balances.' Nadine Strossen, past National President, American Civil Liberties Union (1991-2008) 'Students of the Constitution are familiar with the Framers' fear of the excesses of democracy and their determination to constrain the influence of factions. Huffman is the first scholar to trace the erosion of the Framers' antidemocratic constraints on faction and its contribution to our present political gridlock.' Douglas Ginsburg, Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 'Every student of the Constitution is familiar with the Framers' fear of democratic excess and the antidemocratic features of their Constitution. Huffman is the first to trace the evolution of those features through amendment and judicial interpretation while illuminating our present gridlock and what needs to be done about it.' Christopher DeMuth, former President, American Enterprise Institute (1986-2008)More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Product notice
Paperback (trade)
Illustrations
Worked examples or Exercises
Dimensions
Height: 229 mm
Width: 152 mm
Thickness: 20 mm
Weight
516 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-009-76808-5 (9781009768085)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Book
05/2026
Cambridge University Press
€131.00
Shipment within 15-20 days
Person
James L. Huffman has taught constitutional law for over forty years. He is the author of Private Property and State Power (2013) and Private Property and the Constitution (2013). His commentaries have appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, Quillette, The Hill, Washington Times, and other publications.
Content
Part I. The Curse of Faction: 1. A constitution for a divided nation; 2. A new nation of factions; 3. Political faction and civic virtue; 4. Causes of division; 5. The hazards of political faction; Part II. Remedies for the Curse of Faction; 6. The theoretical republic; 7. Controlling the representatives; 8. A legislature of enumerated powers; 9. An energetic executive of limited authority; 10. An independent judiciary; Part III. Democratization of the Republic: 11. From representation to democratization: political parties; 12. Democratization of American governments; Part IV. A Weakened Constitutional Structure: 13. Expansion of national power; 14. A porous wall of separation; 15. Judicial arrogations and concessions; Part V. A Republic, If We Can Keep It: 16. Where the Framers' design has faltered; 17. Where the Framers' design has worked; 18. Repairing and restoring the Framers' design; Epilogue.