Markets, Games, & Strategic Behavior
Published on 15. September 2006
Book
Hardback
560 pages
978-0-321-41931-6 (ISBN)
Description
Students become fluent in economics when they can apply the concepts in a real, decision-making and strategic environment. For this reason, an increasing number of professors are incorporating experiments into their undergraduate courses.
In his new text, Charles Holt begins each chapter with a lead-off experiment designed as an organizing device to introduce economic concepts such as the Winner's Curse, Asset Market Bubbles, and Rent Seeking. These experiments are easy to facilitate in the classroom, and may be run "by hand" or online via an internet browser.
The early chapters in Part I of the text cover the basics, providing examples that feature markets with buyers and sellers, simple two-person games, and individual lottery choice decision. Professors can choose the order in which they cover later chapter topics, including markets, bargaining, public choice, auctions, individual decisions, games, and asymmetric information.
In his new text, Charles Holt begins each chapter with a lead-off experiment designed as an organizing device to introduce economic concepts such as the Winner's Curse, Asset Market Bubbles, and Rent Seeking. These experiments are easy to facilitate in the classroom, and may be run "by hand" or online via an internet browser.
The early chapters in Part I of the text cover the basics, providing examples that feature markets with buyers and sellers, simple two-person games, and individual lottery choice decision. Professors can choose the order in which they cover later chapter topics, including markets, bargaining, public choice, auctions, individual decisions, games, and asymmetric information.
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
United States
Publishing group
Pearson Education (US)
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 240 mm
Width: 196 mm
Thickness: 33 mm
Weight
1080 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-321-41931-6 (9780321419316)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Content
Part I. Basic Concepts: Decisions, Game Theory, and Market Equilibrium
Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2. A Pit Market
Chapter 3. Some Simple Games: Competition, Coordination, and Guessing
Chapter 4. Risk and Decision Making
Chapter 5. Randomized Strategies
Part II. Market Experiments
Chapter 6. Monopoly and Cournot Markets
Chapter 7. Vertical Market Relationships
Chapter 8. Market Institutions and Power
Chapter 9. Collusion and Price Competition
Chapter 10. Market Failure Due to Unraveling: Lemons and Matching Markets
Chapter 11. Asset Markets and Price Bubbles
Part III. Bargaining and Behavioral Labor Economics
Chapter 12. Ultimatum Bargaining
Chapter 13. Trust, Reciprocity, and Principal-Agent Games
Part IV. Public Choice
Chapter 14. Voluntary Contributions
Chapter 15. The Volunteer's Dilemma
Chapter 16. Externalities, Congestion, and Common Pool Resources
Chapter 17. Rent Seeking
Chapter 18. Voting and Politics Experiments
Part V. Auctions
Chapter 19. Private Value Auctions
Chapter 20. The Takeover Game
Chapter 21. Common-Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse
Chapter 22. Multi-Unit and Combinatorial Auctions
Part VI. Behavioral Game Theory: Treasures and Intuitive Contradictions
Chapter 23. Multi-Stage Games
Chapter 24. Generalized Matching Pennies
Chapter 25. The Traveler's Dilemma
Chapter 26. Coordination Games
Part VII. Individual Decision Experiments
Chapter 27. Probability Matching
Chapter 28. Lottery Choice Anomalies
Chapter 29. ISO (in Search of ...)
Part VIII. Information, Learning, and Signaling
Chapter 30. Bayes' Rule
Chapter 31. Information Cascades
Chapter 32. Statistical Discrimination
Chapter 33. Signaling Games
Chapter 34. Prediction Markets
References
Index
Class Experiments
Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2. A Pit Market
Chapter 3. Some Simple Games: Competition, Coordination, and Guessing
Chapter 4. Risk and Decision Making
Chapter 5. Randomized Strategies
Part II. Market Experiments
Chapter 6. Monopoly and Cournot Markets
Chapter 7. Vertical Market Relationships
Chapter 8. Market Institutions and Power
Chapter 9. Collusion and Price Competition
Chapter 10. Market Failure Due to Unraveling: Lemons and Matching Markets
Chapter 11. Asset Markets and Price Bubbles
Part III. Bargaining and Behavioral Labor Economics
Chapter 12. Ultimatum Bargaining
Chapter 13. Trust, Reciprocity, and Principal-Agent Games
Part IV. Public Choice
Chapter 14. Voluntary Contributions
Chapter 15. The Volunteer's Dilemma
Chapter 16. Externalities, Congestion, and Common Pool Resources
Chapter 17. Rent Seeking
Chapter 18. Voting and Politics Experiments
Part V. Auctions
Chapter 19. Private Value Auctions
Chapter 20. The Takeover Game
Chapter 21. Common-Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse
Chapter 22. Multi-Unit and Combinatorial Auctions
Part VI. Behavioral Game Theory: Treasures and Intuitive Contradictions
Chapter 23. Multi-Stage Games
Chapter 24. Generalized Matching Pennies
Chapter 25. The Traveler's Dilemma
Chapter 26. Coordination Games
Part VII. Individual Decision Experiments
Chapter 27. Probability Matching
Chapter 28. Lottery Choice Anomalies
Chapter 29. ISO (in Search of ...)
Part VIII. Information, Learning, and Signaling
Chapter 30. Bayes' Rule
Chapter 31. Information Cascades
Chapter 32. Statistical Discrimination
Chapter 33. Signaling Games
Chapter 34. Prediction Markets
References
Index
Class Experiments