The Flipside of the Coin: Israel's Lebanese Incursion Between 1982-2000

The study serves as a cautionary tale for all who might be tempted to win political fruits against weaker opponents through the application of conventional military might. Using Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the study explains why the modern state of Israel, which had won numerous wars, was unable to defeat militarily inferior foes during its involvement in Lebanon from 1978 to 2000. The author illustrates vital insight into the broader question of outcomes in wars, providing strategic accounts of Israel's military involvement. The Israeli case lasted twenty-two years, and in that time, it was not able to find the formula to end the conflict once and for all; its pullout in 2000 left vital strategic problems unaddressed. Israel's pullout, however, makes the case more enticing because there is a start point and an endpoint from which to consider Israeli military involvement in Lebanon.