Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches
Published on 17. April 1997
Book
Hardback
VIII, 328 pages
978-3-540-61311-4 (ISBN)
Description
Issues relating to the emergence, persistence, and stability of cooperation among social agents of every type are widely recognized to be of paramount importance. They are also analytically difficult and intellectually challenging. This book, arising from a NATO Advanced Study Institute held at SUNY in 1994, is an up-to-date presentation of the contribution of game theory to the subject. The contributors are leading specialists who focus on the problem from the many different angles of game theory, including axiomatic bargaining theory, the Nash program of non-cooperative foundations, game with complete information, repeated and sequential games, bounded rationality methods, evolutionary theory, experimental approaches, and others. Together they offer significant progress in understanding cooperation.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Heidelberg
Germany
Publishing group
Springer Berlin
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
Illustrations
Dimensions
Height: 23.5 cm
Width: 15.5 cm
Weight
630 gr
ISBN-13
978-3-540-61311-4 (9783540613114)
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-60454-6
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Sergiu Hart | Andreu Mas-Colell
Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches
E-Book
12/2012
Springer
€96.29
Available for download
Sergiu Hart | Andreu Mas-Colell
Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches
Book
02/2012
Springer
€106.99
Shipment within 7-9 days
Content
Introductory Remarks.- A Classical Cooperative Theory.- Cooperative Theory of Bargaining I: Classical.- Cooperative Theory of Bargaining II: Modern Development.- Classical Cooperative Theory I: Core-Like Concepts.- Classical Cooperative Theory II: Value-Like Concepts.- Cooperative Theory with Incomplete Information.- B Non-Cooperative Approaches.- Bargaining Games.- Two Lectures on Implementation Under Complete Information: General Results and the Core.- Implementation Theory with Incomplete Information.- Coalitional Non-Cooperative Approaches to Cooperation.- Situation Approach to Cooperation.- C Dynamic Models.- Cooperation Through Repetition: Complete Information.- Communication, Correlation and Cooperation.- Rationality and Bounded Rationality.- Cooperation, Repetition, and Automata.- Learning in Games: Fictitious Play Dynamics.- Evolution and Games: Replicator Dynamics.- D Descriptive Theory.- Descriptive Approaches to Cooperation.