Social Epistemology
Published on 4. November 2010
Book
Hardback
370 pages
978-0-19-957747-7 (ISBN)
Description
The idea of approaching epistemological concerns from a social perspective is relatively new. For much of its history the epistemological enterprise -- and arguably philosophy more generally -- has been cast along egocentric lines. Where a non-egocentric approach has been taken, as in the recent work of naturalist epistemologists, the focus has been on individuals interacting with their environment rather than on the significance of social interaction for an understanding of the nature and value of knowledge.
The fifteen new essays presented in this volume aim to show the fertility and variety of social epistemology and to set the agenda for future research. They examine not only the well-established topic of testimony, but also newer topics such as disagreement, comprehension, the norm of trust, epistemic value, and the epistemology of silence. Several contributors discuss metaphilosophical issues to do with the nature of social epistemology and what it can contribute to epistemology more generally. Social Epistemology will be essential reading for anyone interested in this fast-growing area of philosophy.
The fifteen new essays presented in this volume aim to show the fertility and variety of social epistemology and to set the agenda for future research. They examine not only the well-established topic of testimony, but also newer topics such as disagreement, comprehension, the norm of trust, epistemic value, and the epistemology of silence. Several contributors discuss metaphilosophical issues to do with the nature of social epistemology and what it can contribute to epistemology more generally. Social Epistemology will be essential reading for anyone interested in this fast-growing area of philosophy.
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 240 mm
Width: 161 mm
Thickness: 24 mm
Weight
719 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-957747-7 (9780199577477)
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Schweitzer Classification
Persons
Adrian Haddock has been a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling since 2004. His current interests lie in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of action. He is the author (with Alan Millar and Duncan Pritchard) of The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (Oxford University Press, 2010), and he recently edited (with Fiona Macpherson) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008).
Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. He is the author (with Adrian Haddock and Duncan Pritchard) of The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (Oxford University Press, 2010) and Understanding People (Oxford University Press, 2004). He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005.
Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh since 2007. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.
Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. He is the author (with Adrian Haddock and Duncan Pritchard) of The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (Oxford University Press, 2010) and Understanding People (Oxford University Press, 2004). He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005.
Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh since 2007. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.
Content
Introduction ; Analytical Table of Contents ; 1. Why Social Epistemology is Real Epistemology ; 2. Testimony, Advocacy, Ignorance: Thinking Ecologically About Social Knowledge ; 3. Scepticism and the Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology in Time ; 4. On Saying that Someone Knows: Themes from Craig ; 5. The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist ; 6. From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism ; 7. Norms of Trust ; 8. Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension ; 9. Knowing From Being Told ; 10. Can A Priori Entitlement Be Preserved By Testimony? ; 11. The Assurance View of Testimony ; 12. The Epistemology of Silence ; 13. Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Disagreement ; 14. The Epistemology of Disagreement ; 15. A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance