
Epistemic Value
Oxford University Press
Published on 3. September 2009
Book
Hardback
370 pages
978-0-19-923118-8 (ISBN)
Description
Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be taken by the theory of knowledge. The contributors are Jason Baehr, Michael Brady, Berit Brogaard, Michael DePaul, Pascal Engel, Catherine Elgin, Alvin Goldman, John Greco, Stephen Grimm, Ward Jones, Martin Kusch, Jonathan Kvanvig, Michael Lynch, Erik Olsson, Wayne Riggs and Matthew Weiner.
Reviews / Votes
This impressive collection of essays exhibits the recent avalue turna in epistemology. * Mark T. Nelson, MIND *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 240 mm
Width: 161 mm
Thickness: 24 mm
Weight
719 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-923118-8 (9780199231188)
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Schweitzer Classification
Persons
Adrian Haddock has been a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling since 2004. His current interests lie in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of action. He recently edited (with Fiona Macpherson) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008).
Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. His book Understanding People (Oxford University Press) was published in 2004. He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005.
Since 2007, Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.
Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. His book Understanding People (Oxford University Press) was published in 2004. He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005.
Since 2007, Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.
Editor
University of Stirling
University of Stirling
University of Edinburgh
Content
Introduction ; PART ONE: THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE ; 1. Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge ; 2. Is There a Value Problem? ; 3. Testimony and the Value of Knowledge ; 4. The Value of Understanding ; 5. Ugly Analyses and Value ; 6. The Goods and the Motivation of Believing ; 7. Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge ; 8. Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value ; 9. Luck, Knowledge, and Control ; PART TWO: TRUTH AND EPISTEMIC APPRAISAL ; 10. The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values ; 11. Epistemic Normativity ; 12. Curiosity and the Value of Truth ; 13. Epistemic Value Monism, or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth ; APPENDIX: SYMPOSIUM ON JONATHAN KVANVIG'S THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE PURSUIT OF UNDERSTANDING ; 14. Precis of The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding ; 15. The Value Problem ; 16. Is Understanding Factive? ; 17. Understanding, Knowledge and the Meno Requirement ; 18. Responses to Critics