The Politics of Property Rights
Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929
Published on 26. July 2004
Book
Paperback/Softback
406 pages
978-0-521-60354-6 (ISBN)
Description
This book addresses a puzzle in political economy: why is it that political instability does not necessarily translate into economic stagnation or collapse? In order to address this puzzle, it advances a theory about property rights systems in many less developed countries. In this theory, governments do not have to enforce property rights as a public good. Instead, they may enforce property rights selectively (as a private good), and share the resulting rents with the group of asset holders who are integrated into the government. Focusing on Mexico, this book explains how the property rights system was constructed during the Porfirio Diaz dictatorship (1876-1911) and then explores how this property rights system either survived, or was reconstructed. The result is an analytic economic history of Mexico under both stability and instability, and a generalizable framework about the interaction of political and economic institutions.
Reviews / Votes
"An impressive volume wih useful and clever statistical measurements of the performance of various parts of the economy, and it certainly is valuable addition to the economic history of Mexico." EH.net "Helps to unpack the diffuclt instability-growth puzzle." APSA Perspectives on PoliticsMore details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
Paperback (trade)
Illustrations
64 Tables, unspecified; 1 Maps; 5 Line drawings, unspecified
Dimensions
Height: 229 mm
Width: 152 mm
Thickness: 22 mm
Weight
586 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-521-60354-6 (9780521603546)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Stephen Haber | Armando Razo | Noel Maurer
The Politics of Property Rights
Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929
E-Book
12/2004
1st Edition
Cambridge University Press
€38.49
Available for download
Stephen Haber | Armando Razo | Noel Maurer
The Politics of Property Rights
Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929
Book
05/2003
Cambridge University Press
€130.30
Shipment within 15-20 days
Persons
Stephen Haber is A. A. and Jeanne Welch Milligan Professor at Stanford University, where he teaches political science and history. He is also the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution. Haber also serves as Director of Stanford's Social Science History Institute. He is the author of numerous books and articles, including Industry and Underdevelopment: The Industrialization of Mexico, 1890-1940 (1989) and How Latin America Fell Behind (1997). Armando Razo is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. He has published articles in World Politics and the Journal of Latin American Studies. Professor Noel Maurer is Assistant Professor of Economics at ITAM. He has been a lecturer at Stanford University, and is the author of The Power and the Money: The Mexican Financial System, 1876-1931, as well as the author of articles for journals such as the Journal of Economic History and the Journal of Latin American Studies.
Content
1. Introduction; 2. Theory: instability, credible commitments, and growth; 3. VPI coalitions in historical perspective: Mexico's turbulent politics, 1876-1929; 4. Finance; 5. Industry; 6. Petroleum; 7. Mining; 8. Agriculture; 9. Conclusion.