The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda
The Role of Bystanders
Published on 23. May 2007
Book
Hardback
330 pages
978-90-04-15781-1 (ISBN)
Description
This volume is about the failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994. In particular, the research focuses on why the early warnings of an emerging genocide were not translated into early preventative action. The warnings were well documented by the most authoritative source, the Canadian U.N. peace-keeping commander General Romeo Dallaire and sent to the leading political civil servants in New York. The communications and the decisionmaking are scrutinized, i.e., who received what messages at what time, to whom the messages were forwarded and which (non-) decisions were taken in response to the alarming reports of weapon deliveries and atrocities. This book makes clear that this genocide could have been prevented.
Published under the Transnational Publishers imprint.
Published under the Transnational Publishers imprint.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Netherlands
Publishing group
Brill
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Cloth over boards
Dimensions
Height: 238 mm
Width: 156 mm
Thickness: 29 mm
Weight
659 gr
ISBN-13
978-90-04-15781-1 (9789004157811)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Content
Preface; Acknowledgments; List of Abbreviations; List of Actors; Glossary;
Chapter 1: Early Warnings and Early Action by Bystanders Introduction;
Chapter 2: The Tribunal=s Interpretation and Implementation of the Genocide Convention;
Chapter 3: Undermining UNAMIR;
Chapter 4: Rwandan History;
Chapter 5: Early Warning of Atrocities in 1991-1994;
Chapter 6: The Installment of UNAMIR with Belgian Participation;
Chapter 7: Early Warnings from November to January;
Chapter 8: The Genocide Fax and the Prohibition from U.N. Headquarters to Act;
Chapter 9: The Non-Response of New York and Capitals in the West to the Deteriorating Situation;
Chapter 10: Deteriorating Security in Rwanda and the Non-Response from New York from January Up Until March;
Chapter 11: Requests from Dallaire and from Belgium to New York for a Stronger and Firmer Broadened Mandate of UNAMIR;
Chapter 12: UNAMIR: Its Mandate and the Offending Belgian Role;
Chapter 13: The Start of the Genocide;
Chapter 14: Evacuation;
Chapter 15: Belgian Decision to Withdraw Its Troops;
Chapter 16: The Response of the Security Council;
Chapter 17: The Role of the Netherlands Throughout the Genocide;
Chapter 18: Apologies from Bystanders Ten Years Later;
Chapter 19: Conclusions;
Annexes;
Bibliography;
Index ;
Chapter 1: Early Warnings and Early Action by Bystanders Introduction;
Chapter 2: The Tribunal=s Interpretation and Implementation of the Genocide Convention;
Chapter 3: Undermining UNAMIR;
Chapter 4: Rwandan History;
Chapter 5: Early Warning of Atrocities in 1991-1994;
Chapter 6: The Installment of UNAMIR with Belgian Participation;
Chapter 7: Early Warnings from November to January;
Chapter 8: The Genocide Fax and the Prohibition from U.N. Headquarters to Act;
Chapter 9: The Non-Response of New York and Capitals in the West to the Deteriorating Situation;
Chapter 10: Deteriorating Security in Rwanda and the Non-Response from New York from January Up Until March;
Chapter 11: Requests from Dallaire and from Belgium to New York for a Stronger and Firmer Broadened Mandate of UNAMIR;
Chapter 12: UNAMIR: Its Mandate and the Offending Belgian Role;
Chapter 13: The Start of the Genocide;
Chapter 14: Evacuation;
Chapter 15: Belgian Decision to Withdraw Its Troops;
Chapter 16: The Response of the Security Council;
Chapter 17: The Role of the Netherlands Throughout the Genocide;
Chapter 18: Apologies from Bystanders Ten Years Later;
Chapter 19: Conclusions;
Annexes;
Bibliography;
Index ;