
One True Logic
A Monist Manifesto
Oxford University Press
Published on 19. May 2022
Book
Hardback
266 pages
978-0-19-882971-3 (ISBN)
Description
Logical monism is the claim that there is a single correct logic, the 'one true logic' of our title. The view has evident appeal, as it reflects assumptions made in ordinary reasoning as well as in mathematics, the sciences, and the law. In all these spheres, we tend to believe that there are determinate facts about the validity of arguments. Despite its evident appeal, however, logical monism must meet two challenges. The first is the challenge from logical pluralism, according to which there is more than one correct logic. The second challenge is to determine which form of logical monism is the correct one.
One True Logic is the first monograph to explicitly articulate a version of logical monism and defend it against the first challenge. It provides a critical overview of the monism vs pluralism debate and argues for the former. It also responds to the second challenge by defending a particular monism, based on a highly infinitary logic. It breaks new ground on a number of fronts and unifies disparate discussions in the philosophical and logical literature. In particular, it generalises the Tarski-Sher criterion of logicality, provides a novel defence of this generalisation, offers a clear new argument for the logicality of infinitary logic and replies to recent pluralist arguments.
One True Logic is the first monograph to explicitly articulate a version of logical monism and defend it against the first challenge. It provides a critical overview of the monism vs pluralism debate and argues for the former. It also responds to the second challenge by defending a particular monism, based on a highly infinitary logic. It breaks new ground on a number of fronts and unifies disparate discussions in the philosophical and logical literature. In particular, it generalises the Tarski-Sher criterion of logicality, provides a novel defence of this generalisation, offers a clear new argument for the logicality of infinitary logic and replies to recent pluralist arguments.
Reviews / Votes
One True Logic is the first monograph to explicitly articulate a version of logical monism and defend it against the first challenge. It provides a critical overview of the monism vs pluralism debate and argues for the former. It also responds to the second challenge by defending a particular monism, based on a highly infinitary logic. It breaks new ground on a number of fronts and unifies disparate discussions in the philosophical and logical literature. * MathSciNet * In One True Logic: A Monist Manifesto, Griffiths and Paseau set out to defend the doctrine known as logical monism. In short, the book is part of an ongoing debate between logical pluralists and logical monists...Their work is challenging yet worth the effort. It advances a strong defense of logical monism by offering just as strong objections to logical pluralism. Anyone interested in the philosophy of logic must read this book! * Choice * a bold and original book. Its discussion of foundational questions about logic is detailed and mathematically rigorous. At the same time, it is admirably clear and approachable. It is also fun to read. Its uncompromising style ...its precise argumentation, and its dialectical clarity make it an engaging and thought-provoking investigation into the nature of logical consequence... full of original arguments worthy of discussion... a fascinating and rich book. * Erik Stei, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Cloth over boards
Dimensions
Height: 237 mm
Width: 155 mm
Thickness: 26 mm
Weight
530 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-882971-3 (9780198829713)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

Book
06/2025
Oxford University Press
€35.50
Shipment within 15-20 days

E-Book
05/2022
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€48.99
Available for download
Persons
Owen Griffiths is a philosopher of logic and language, and a lecturer at University College London and the University of Cambridge. He is the author of several research articles and chapters in collected volumes, and winner of a 2022 Pilkington Prize for outstanding teaching at the University of Cambridge.
A. C. Paseau is the Stuart Hampshire Fellow at Wadham College and Professor of Mathematical Philosophy at the University of Oxford. Author of more than 50 research articles and reviews, he has also edited the 5-volume anthology Philosophy of Mathematics (Routledge 2017) and co-edited the collection Mathematical Knowledge (OUP 2007).
A. C. Paseau is the Stuart Hampshire Fellow at Wadham College and Professor of Mathematical Philosophy at the University of Oxford. Author of more than 50 research articles and reviews, he has also edited the 5-volume anthology Philosophy of Mathematics (Routledge 2017) and co-edited the collection Mathematical Knowledge (OUP 2007).
Author
Lecturer in PhilosophyLecturer in Philosophy, UCL and University of Cambridge
Professor of Mathematical PhilosophyProfessor of Mathematical Philosophy, University of Oxford
Content
Introduction
Prologue
1: Conceptions of Logical Consequence
2: What is Monism?
3: Against Pluralism
4: The LIFGIFS Hypothesis
5: Beyond the Finitary
6: Isomorphism Invariance
7: Towards the One True Logic
8: The Heterogeneity Objection
9: The Overgeneration Objection
10: The Absoluteness Objection
11: The Intensional Objection
Conclusion
Prologue
1: Conceptions of Logical Consequence
2: What is Monism?
3: Against Pluralism
4: The LIFGIFS Hypothesis
5: Beyond the Finitary
6: Isomorphism Invariance
7: Towards the One True Logic
8: The Heterogeneity Objection
9: The Overgeneration Objection
10: The Absoluteness Objection
11: The Intensional Objection
Conclusion