The Populist Paradox
Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation
Published on 21. July 1999
Book
Paperback/Softback
176 pages
978-0-691-00267-5 (ISBN)
Description
Do small but wealthy interest groups influence referendums, ballot initiatives, and other forms of direct legislation at the expense of the broader public interest? Many observers argue that they do, often lamenting that direct legislation has, paradoxically, been captured by the very same wealthy interests whose power it was designed to curb. Elisabeth Gerber, however, challenges that argument. In this first systematic study of how money and interest group power actually affect direct legislation, she reveals that big spending does not necessarily mean big influence. Gerber bases her findings on extensive surveys of the activities and motivations of interest groups and on close examination of campaign finance records from 168 direct legislation campaigns in eight states. Her research confirms what such wealthy interests as the insurance industry, trial lawyer associations, and tobacco companies have learned by defeats at the ballot box: if citizens do not like a proposed new law, even an expensive, high-profile campaign will not make them change their mind.
She demonstrates, however, that these economic interest groups have considerable success in using direct legislation to block initiatives that others are proposing and to exert pressure on politicians. By contrast, citizen interest groups with broad-based support and significant organizational resources have proven to be extremely effective in using direct legislation to pass new laws. Clearly written and argued, this is a major theoretical and empirical contribution to our understanding of the role of citizens and organized interests in the American legislative process.
She demonstrates, however, that these economic interest groups have considerable success in using direct legislation to block initiatives that others are proposing and to exert pressure on politicians. By contrast, citizen interest groups with broad-based support and significant organizational resources have proven to be extremely effective in using direct legislation to pass new laws. Clearly written and argued, this is a major theoretical and empirical contribution to our understanding of the role of citizens and organized interests in the American legislative process.
Reviews / Votes
"Gerber's key finding-that citizen interest groups are more effective in using the initiative to alter the status quo, and that economic groups are more effective at preserving it-is an important amendment to the popular perception that interest groups now control the initiative process."-Bruce E. Cain, University of California, Berkeley "The questions raised in The Populist Paradox are fundamental to our understanding of elections and representation and to the roles of citizens, organized interests, and elected officials. The book is well written and extremely well organized."-Frank R. Baumgartner, Pennsylvania State UniversityMore details
Language
English
Place of publication
New Jersey
United States
Target group
Professional and scholarly
College/higher education
Product notice
Paperback (trade)
Illustrations
36 tables 9 line illus.
Dimensions
Height: 229 mm
Width: 152 mm
Thickness: 10 mm
Weight
282 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-691-00267-5 (9780691002675)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Person
Elisabeth R. Gerber, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, studies the consequences of U.S. election laws on interest representation. She is currently working on a major study of primary election laws in the American states.
Content
List of Figures List of Tables xi Acknowledgments xiii 1. What Is the Populist Paradox? 3 A Theory of Interest Group Influence 6 Motivation: The Study of Interest Group Influence 10 Justification: Why Study Direct Legislation? 15 Plan of the Book 19 2. Interest Group Choice 21 Forms of Influence 21 Interest Group Choice 27 Achieving Influence 30 Summary and Conclusions 36 3. Direct Legislation Hurdles 37 Achieving Direct Modifying Influence 38 Achieving Direct Preserving Influence Achieving Indirect Modifying Influence 50 Achieving Indirect Preserving Influence: Opposing an Initiative to Signal the Legislature 52 Behavioral Hurdles 52 Summary and Conclusions 58 4. Group Characteristics and Resources 59 Monetary and Personnel Resources 59 Using Resources to Overcome Hurdles 60 Membership Characteristics 65 Classifying Groups and Their Resources 69 Hypotheses about Motivations and Forms of Influence 71 Summary 75 5. Motivations and Strategies 76 Methodology 76 What Do Groups Say They Do? 80 What Do Groups Actually Do? 93 Summary and Conclusions 100 6.Direct Policy Consequences 101 Direct Policy Consequences 101 Summary and Conclusions 119 7. Indirect Policy Consequences 121 State Policy Differences 122 Summary and Conclusions 136 8.The Populist Paradox: Reality Or Illusion? 137 Economic Group Limitations 137 Citizen Group Dominance 140 Implications for the Study of Direct Legislation 140 Implications for the Study Of Interest Group Influence 141 Positive versus Normative Implications 142 A Final Assessment 146 Appendixes 147 A. Direct Legislation Institutions 147 B. Survey Of Organizations 152 References 159 Index 165