
Self-Experience
Essays on Inner Awareness
Oxford University Press
Published on 2. February 2023
Book
Hardback
378 pages
978-0-19-880539-7 (ISBN)
Description
Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have shown renewed interest for the idea that experience generally includes an experience of the self--a self-experience--whatever else it may present the self with. When a subject has an ordinary experience (as of a bouncing red ball, for example), the thought goes, she is not just phenomenally aware of the world as being presented in a certain way (a bouncy, reddish, roundish way in this case); she is also phenomenally aware of the fact that it is presented to her. This supposed phenomenal dimension has been variously called mineness, for-me-ness, pre-reflective self-awareness and subjective character, among others.
This view, associated with historical figures such as William James, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre, is attracting a new surge of attention at the crossroads of phenomenology, analytic philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of cognitive science, but also intense controversy.
This book explores some of the questions running through the ongoing debate on the putative subjective dimension of experience: Does it exist?, the existence question; What is it?, the essence question; What is it for?, the function question; and What else does it explain?, the explanation question.
The volume also surveys various domains of human experience, both normal and pathological, where a 'sense of self' might be at play, including agency, bodily awareness, introspection, memory, emotions, and values, and offers insights into the possible relations between the notions of subjective awareness involved.
The first part of the book is devoted to more sceptical or deflationary views about self-experience, and the second, to more robust ones.
This view, associated with historical figures such as William James, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre, is attracting a new surge of attention at the crossroads of phenomenology, analytic philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of cognitive science, but also intense controversy.
This book explores some of the questions running through the ongoing debate on the putative subjective dimension of experience: Does it exist?, the existence question; What is it?, the essence question; What is it for?, the function question; and What else does it explain?, the explanation question.
The volume also surveys various domains of human experience, both normal and pathological, where a 'sense of self' might be at play, including agency, bodily awareness, introspection, memory, emotions, and values, and offers insights into the possible relations between the notions of subjective awareness involved.
The first part of the book is devoted to more sceptical or deflationary views about self-experience, and the second, to more robust ones.
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Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
College/higher education
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Cloth over boards
Illustrations
4 line drawings, 1 half tone
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 160 mm
Thickness: 29 mm
Weight
698 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-880539-7 (9780198805397)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

E-Book
01/2023
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€69.49
Available for download

E-Book
01/2023
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€69.49
Available for download
Persons
Manuel Garcia-Carpintero is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Barcelona, Spain. He has been a fellow at the Center for the Advanced Studies in the Humanities (Edinburgh, 2001), and he has been appointed Visiting Professor at the University of Lisbon (2013-onwards). His main interests are in philosophical logic, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and related epistemological and metaphysical issues.
Marie Guillot is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex. Her research focuses on issues in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, especially subjectivity, self-consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, indexicality, and the ethics and politics of speech acts.
Marie Guillot is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex. Her research focuses on issues in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, especially subjectivity, self-consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, indexicality, and the ethics and politics of speech acts.
Editor
Professor of PhilosophyProfessor of Philosophy, Universitat de Barcelona
Senior Lecturer in PhilosophySenior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Essex
Content
1: Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Marie Guillot: Introduction: Views about Self-Experience Part I: Doubts and Questions About Self-Experience 2: Lea Salje and Alexander Geddes: Conscious Experience: What's In It For Me? 3: Tom McClelland: Four Impediments to the Case for Mineness 4: Robert Howell: Transparency and Subjective Character 5: Gianfranco Soldati: Mineness, Deflation, and Transparency 6: Wayne Wu: Mineness and Introspective Data 7: Krisztina Orban and Hong Yu Wong: The Sense of Body Ownership: What Are We Studying? Part II: Putting Self-Experience to Work 8: Uriah Kriegel: The Three Circles of Consciousness 9: Martine Nida-Ruemelin: Experiencing Subjects and So-called Mine-ness 10: Marie Guillot: The Phenomenal Concept of Self and First-Person Epistemology 11: Carlota Serrahima: The Bounded Body: On the Sense of Bodily Ownership and the Experience of Space 12: Frederique de Vignemont: The Phenomenology of Bodily Ownership 13: Richard Dub: Emotions of Mineness 14: Alexandre Billon: What Is It Like to Lack Mineness? Depersonalization as a Probe for the Scope, Nature and Role of Mineness 15: Jordi Fernandez: The Ownership of Memories