
Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb
Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945
Oxford University Press
Published on 1. April 1999
Book
Hardback
408 pages
978-0-19-829468-9 (ISBN)
Description
Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945 is a path-breaking work that uses biographical techniques to test one of the most important and widely debated questions in international politics: Did the advent of the nuclear bomb prevent the Third World War?
Many scholars and much conventional wisdom assumes that nuclear deterrence has prevented major power war since the end of the Second World War; this remains a principal tenet of US strategic policy today. Others challenge this assumption, and argue that major war would have been `obsolete' even without the bomb.
This book tests these propositions by examining the careers of ten leading Cold War statesmen--Harry S Truman; John Foster Dulles; Dwight D. Eisenhower; John F. Kennedy; Josef Stalin; Nikita Krushchev; Mao Zedong; Winston Churchill; Charles De Gaulle; and Konrad Adenauer--and asking whether they viewed war, and its acceptability, differently after the advent of the bomb. The book's authors argue almost unanimously that nuclear weapons did have a significant effect on the thinking of these leading statesmen of the nuclear age, but a dissenting epilogue from John Mueller challenges this thesis.
Many scholars and much conventional wisdom assumes that nuclear deterrence has prevented major power war since the end of the Second World War; this remains a principal tenet of US strategic policy today. Others challenge this assumption, and argue that major war would have been `obsolete' even without the bomb.
This book tests these propositions by examining the careers of ten leading Cold War statesmen--Harry S Truman; John Foster Dulles; Dwight D. Eisenhower; John F. Kennedy; Josef Stalin; Nikita Krushchev; Mao Zedong; Winston Churchill; Charles De Gaulle; and Konrad Adenauer--and asking whether they viewed war, and its acceptability, differently after the advent of the bomb. The book's authors argue almost unanimously that nuclear weapons did have a significant effect on the thinking of these leading statesmen of the nuclear age, but a dissenting epilogue from John Mueller challenges this thesis.
Reviews / Votes
excellent and scholarly collection * Lawrence Freedman, TLS *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 240 mm
Width: 161 mm
Thickness: 27 mm
Weight
781 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-829468-9 (9780198294689)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Persons
PROFESSOR JOHN GADDIS is Professor of History at Yale
DR PHILIP GORDON is Director for European Affairs, National Security Council, Washington
PROFESSOR ERNEST MAY is Professor of History at Harvard
PROFESSOR JONATHAN ROSENBERG is Assistant Professor of History at Florida Atlantic University
DR PHILIP GORDON is Director for European Affairs, National Security Council, Washington
PROFESSOR ERNEST MAY is Professor of History at Harvard
PROFESSOR JONATHAN ROSENBERG is Assistant Professor of History at Florida Atlantic University
Editor
Robert Lovett Professor of HistoryRobert Lovett Professor of History, Yale University
Director for European AffairsDirector for European Affairs, National Security Council, Washington
Professor of HistoryProfessor of History, Harvard University
Assistant Professor of HistoryAssistant Professor of History, Florida Atlantic University
Content
Introduction by Ernest May ; 1. 'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution ; 2. Longing for International Control, Banking on American Superiority: Harry S Truman's Approach to Nuclear Energy ; 3. Stalin and the Nuclear Age ; 4. John Foster Dulles' Nuclear Schizophrenia ; 5. Bear Any Burden?: John F. Kennedy and Nuclear Weapon ; 6. The Nuclear Education of Nikita Khrushchev ; 7. Before the Bomb and After: Winston Churchill and the Use of Force ; 8. Between 'Paper' and 'Real' Tigers: Mao's View of Nuclear Weapons ; 9. Charles De Gaulle and the Nuclear Revolution ; 10. Konrad Adenauer: Defence Diplomat on the Backstage ; Conclusion. Nuclear Statesmen ; Epilogue