Thomas Reid and the Defence of Duty
Published on 1. March 2024
Book
Hardback
224 pages
978-1-4744-5534-3 (ISBN)
Description
Is morality a subjective matter, dependent on our desires and interests, or are there objective moral truths? And if the latter, can we explain the objectivity of morality without appeal to metaphysics, a robust teleology or divine command?
This book argues that we find just such an account of moral objectivity in Thomas Reid's Defence of Duty. To make this case, the book provides an explanation of Reid's way of philosophy and his reasons for rejecting moral subjectivism; presents Reid's account of the concept, perception, and motivational force of duty; and responds to contemporary challenges of moral subjectivism and moral pessimism from the perspective of his moral philosophy. Further, this book argues that if Reid is correct, then there is an urgent need to reform current pedagogical practice and return to the teaching of practical ethics.
This book argues that we find just such an account of moral objectivity in Thomas Reid's Defence of Duty. To make this case, the book provides an explanation of Reid's way of philosophy and his reasons for rejecting moral subjectivism; presents Reid's account of the concept, perception, and motivational force of duty; and responds to contemporary challenges of moral subjectivism and moral pessimism from the perspective of his moral philosophy. Further, this book argues that if Reid is correct, then there is an urgent need to reform current pedagogical practice and return to the teaching of practical ethics.
Reviews / Votes
The central thesis of James Foster's Thomas Reid and the Defence of Duty is that Reid was mostly right - and Hume mostly wrong - about the nature of right and wrong. Anyone who dogmatically denies the objectivity of moral distinctions ought to read Foster's book; it is lucid, lively and wise. -- Douglas McDermid, Trent University An enlightening, valuable, and significant contribution not only to the literature on Reid's moral theory but even more to important issues and debates running through the corpus of modern and contemporary moral theory. -- Fotini Vaki, Ionian University * Eighteenth-Century Scotland * James Foster's work provides excellent access to the heart of Reid's moral philosophy: it gives readers unfamiliar with the Scottish philosopher the means to grasp the methodological, epistemological, and historical background essential for understanding its scope. -- Benoit Gide * Archives de philosophie *More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Edinburgh
United Kingdom
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Cloth over boards
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 156 mm
Thickness: 14 mm
Weight
490 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-4744-5534-3 (9781474455343)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
James Foster
Thomas Reid and the Defence of Duty
E-Book
03/2024
Edinburgh University Press
€87.49
Available for download
Person
James J.S. Foster is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology and Director of the Honors Program at the University of Sioux Falls. His previously published two edited volumes, Scottish Philosophy in America (Imprint Academic, 2012) and Thomas Reid on Religion (Imprint Academic, 2017). He is also the editor of the Journal of Scottish Philosophy.
Content
PrefaceSeries Editor's Introduction
Part I: Reid's Rejection of Moral Subjectivism
Chapter 1. Reid's Way of Philosophy
Chapter 2. Reid, Perception and Common Sense
Chapter 3. Reid's Arguments against Moral Subjectivity
Part II: Reid's Account of Duty
Chapter 4. Defining Duty
Chapter 5. Moral Perception
Chapter 6. Moral Motivation
Part III: Objections to Reid's Account
Chapter 7. The Argument from Strangeness
Chapter 8. The Argument from Relativity
Chapter 9. The Argument from Interminability
Conclusion: The Practical Implications of Reid's Defence of DutyWorks CitedIndex
Part I: Reid's Rejection of Moral Subjectivism
Chapter 1. Reid's Way of Philosophy
Chapter 2. Reid, Perception and Common Sense
Chapter 3. Reid's Arguments against Moral Subjectivity
Part II: Reid's Account of Duty
Chapter 4. Defining Duty
Chapter 5. Moral Perception
Chapter 6. Moral Motivation
Part III: Objections to Reid's Account
Chapter 7. The Argument from Strangeness
Chapter 8. The Argument from Relativity
Chapter 9. The Argument from Interminability
Conclusion: The Practical Implications of Reid's Defence of DutyWorks CitedIndex