
Hume Variations
Jerry A. Fodor(Author)
Oxford University Press
Published on 24. November 2005
Book
Paperback/Softback
176 pages
978-0-19-928733-8 (ISBN)
Description
Hume? Yes, David Hume, that's who Jerry Fodor looks to for help in advancing our understanding of the mind. Fodor claims his Treatise of Human Nature as the foundational document of cognitive science: it launched the project of constructing an empirical psychology on the basis of a representational theory of mind. Going back to this work after more than 250 years we find that Hume is remarkably perceptive about the components and structure that a theory of mind requires. Careful study of the Treatise helps us to see what's amiss with much twentieth-century philosophy of mind, and to get on the right track.
Hume says in the Treatise that his main project is to construct a theory of human nature and, in particular, a theory of the mind. Hume Variations examines his account of cognition and how it is grounded in his 'theory of ideas'. Fodor discusses such key topics as the distinction between 'simple' and 'complex' ideas, the thesis that an idea is some kind of picture, and the roles that 'association' and 'imagination' play in cognitive processes. He argues that the theory of ideas, as Hume develops it, is both historically and ideologically continuous with the representational theory of mind as it is now widely endorsed by cognitive scientists. This view of Hume is explicitly opposed to recent discussions by critics who hold that the theory of ideas is the Achilles heel of his philosophy and that he would surely have abandoned it if only he had read Wittgenstein carefully.
You don't have to know much about Hume to enjoy this inventively argued, provocative, and stimulating defence of the representational theory of mind--which is looking increasingly hard to resist.
LINES OF THOUGHT
Philosophy books don't need to be hundreds of pages long to make a substantial contribution to the subject. This new series presents original works by leading philosophers at an affordable price and a readable length.
Series Editors
Peter Ludlow (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)
Scott Sturgeon (Birkbeck College, London)
Hume says in the Treatise that his main project is to construct a theory of human nature and, in particular, a theory of the mind. Hume Variations examines his account of cognition and how it is grounded in his 'theory of ideas'. Fodor discusses such key topics as the distinction between 'simple' and 'complex' ideas, the thesis that an idea is some kind of picture, and the roles that 'association' and 'imagination' play in cognitive processes. He argues that the theory of ideas, as Hume develops it, is both historically and ideologically continuous with the representational theory of mind as it is now widely endorsed by cognitive scientists. This view of Hume is explicitly opposed to recent discussions by critics who hold that the theory of ideas is the Achilles heel of his philosophy and that he would surely have abandoned it if only he had read Wittgenstein carefully.
You don't have to know much about Hume to enjoy this inventively argued, provocative, and stimulating defence of the representational theory of mind--which is looking increasingly hard to resist.
LINES OF THOUGHT
Philosophy books don't need to be hundreds of pages long to make a substantial contribution to the subject. This new series presents original works by leading philosophers at an affordable price and a readable length.
Series Editors
Peter Ludlow (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)
Scott Sturgeon (Birkbeck College, London)
Reviews / Votes
Review from previous edition Hume Variations relaunches [Fodor's] attack on pragmatism from the perspective of Hume's theory of ideas. This is Fodor at his polemical best: imaginative, irreverent, sceptical, argumentatively assured - and funny, too, in his effortless, inimitable way. * Tim Crane, Times Literary Supplement * ... a book whose brevity does not come at the expense of rigour, clarity or ambition. * New Humanist *More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Scholars and students of philosophy, particularly of mind and language, and of the history of ideas, psychologists, cognitive scientists, linguists
Dimensions
Height: 197 mm
Width: 130 mm
Thickness: 14 mm
Weight
199 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-928733-8 (9780199287338)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Person
Jerry A. Fodor, Rutgers University, New Jersey
Content
Preface: Old Lamps for New ; 1. Introduction: Hume's Cartesian Naturalism ; 2. Impressions ; 3. Simple Concepts ; 4. Complex Concepts (Occasional Wittgensteinians Notwithstanding) ; 5. Imagination ; 6. Conclusion: Hume's Program (and Ours)