Semantic Relationism
1st Edition
Published on 17. July 2007
Book
Hardback
160 pages
978-1-4051-0843-0 (ISBN)
Description
Introducing a new and ambitious position in the field, Kit Fine's Semantic Relationism is a major contribution to the philosophy of language.
Written by one of today's most respected philosophers
Argues for a fundamentally new approach to the study of representation in language and thought
Proposes that there may be representational relationships between expressions or elements of thought that are not grounded in the intrinsic representational features of the expressions or elements themselves
Forms part of the prestigious new Blackwell/Brown Lectures in Philosophy series, based on an ongoing series of lectures by today's leading philosophers
Written by one of today's most respected philosophers
Argues for a fundamentally new approach to the study of representation in language and thought
Proposes that there may be representational relationships between expressions or elements of thought that are not grounded in the intrinsic representational features of the expressions or elements themselves
Forms part of the prestigious new Blackwell/Brown Lectures in Philosophy series, based on an ongoing series of lectures by today's leading philosophers
Reviews / Votes
"Combines careful, detailed argumentation with inspiration and synoptic vision for the bigger picture. ... One can reasonably expect Fine's book to be a spur for thinking about these issues for many years to come." (Mind, October 2009)More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Hoboken
United Kingdom
Publishing group
John Wiley and Sons Ltd
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Paper over boards
With dust jacket
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 161 mm
Thickness: 19 mm
Weight
381 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-4051-0843-0 (9781405108430)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Person
Kit Fine is Silver Professor of Philosophy and Mathematics at New York University, and specializes in Metaphysics, Logic, and Philosophy of Language. He has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation and the American Council of Learned Societies and is a former editor of the Journal of Symbolic Logic. He is the author of Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers (2005), and the co-author of Worlds, Times and Selves and Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects (Blackwell, 1985). He has also written papers in ancient philosophy, linguistics, computer science, and economic theory, in addition to the papers in his central fields of interest.
Content
Preface. Introduction.
1. Coordination among Variables.
A. The Desiderata.
B. The Problem.
C. The Contextualist Response.
D. The Dismissive Response.
E. The Instantial Approach.
F. The Algebraic Approach.
G. Relational Semantics for First-order Logic.
2. Coordination within Language.
A. Frege's Puzzle.
B. Rejecting Compositionality.
C. Semantic Fact.
D. Closure.
E. Referentialism Reconsidered.
F. A Relational Semantics for Names.
G. Transparency.
3. Coordination within Thought.
A. Intentional Coordination.
B. Strict Co-representation.
C. The Content of Thought.
D. The Cognitive Puzzle.
4. Coordination between Speakers.
A. Kripke's Puzzle.
B. Some Related Puzzles.
C. A Response.
D. A Solution.
E. A Deeper Puzzle.
F. A Deeper Solution.
G. The Role of Variables in Belief Reports.
H. Some Semantical Morals.
Postscript: Further Work.
Index
1. Coordination among Variables.
A. The Desiderata.
B. The Problem.
C. The Contextualist Response.
D. The Dismissive Response.
E. The Instantial Approach.
F. The Algebraic Approach.
G. Relational Semantics for First-order Logic.
2. Coordination within Language.
A. Frege's Puzzle.
B. Rejecting Compositionality.
C. Semantic Fact.
D. Closure.
E. Referentialism Reconsidered.
F. A Relational Semantics for Names.
G. Transparency.
3. Coordination within Thought.
A. Intentional Coordination.
B. Strict Co-representation.
C. The Content of Thought.
D. The Cognitive Puzzle.
4. Coordination between Speakers.
A. Kripke's Puzzle.
B. Some Related Puzzles.
C. A Response.
D. A Solution.
E. A Deeper Puzzle.
F. A Deeper Solution.
G. The Role of Variables in Belief Reports.
H. Some Semantical Morals.
Postscript: Further Work.
Index