Computers and Cognition
Why Minds are Not Machines
James H. Fetzer(Author)
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Published on 31. December 2000
Book
Hardback
340 pages
978-0-7923-6615-7 (ISBN)
Description
A collection of studies providing a perspective on the nature of mind, including arguments that explain why the prevailing paradigm endash the computational conception of language and mentality - can no longer be sustained. An alternative approach is advanced, inspired by the work of Charles S. Pierce, according to which minds are sign-using (or "semiotic") systems, which in turn generates distinctions between different kinds of minds and overcomes problems that burden more familiar alternatives. Unlike conceptions of minds as machines, this approach has obvious evolutionary implications, where differences in semiotic abilities tend to distinguish the species. From this point of view, the scope and limits of computer and AI systems can be more adequately appraised and alternative accounts of consciousness and cognition can be more thoroughly criticised. Readership: Intermediate and advanced students of computer science, AI, cognitive science, and all students of the philosophy of the mind.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
United States
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
indexes
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 156 mm
ISBN-13
978-0-7923-6615-7 (9780792366157)
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Book
11/2001
Kluwer Academic Publishers
€53.49
Shipment within 15-20 days
Content
Series Preface. Foreword. Acknowledgements. Prologue. 1. Minds and Machines: Behaviorism, Dualism, and Beyond. Part I: Semiotic Systems. 2. Primitive Concepts: Habits, Conventions, and Laws. 3. Signs and Minds: An Introduction to the Theory of Semiotic Systems. 4. Language and Mentality: Computational, Representational, and Dispositional Conceptions. Part II: Computers and Cognition. 5. Mental Algorithms: Are Minds Computational Systems? 6. What Makes Connectionism Different? A Critical Review of Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. 7. People are Not Computers: (most) Thought Professes are Not Computational Procedures. Part III: Computer Epistemology. 8. Program Verification: The Very Idea. 9. Philosophical Aspects of Program Verification. 10. Philosophy and Computer Science: Reflections on the Program Verification Debate. Epilogue. 11. Computer Reliability and Public Policy: Limits of Knowledge of Computer-Based Systems. Index of Names. Index of Subjects.