Topics in Social Choice
Sophisticated Voting, Efficacy, and Proportional Representation
Published on 23. May 1990
Book
Hardback
232 pages
978-0-275-93430-9 (ISBN)
Description
Based on a four year research project investigating voting behavior, Topics In Social Choice begins with the well-known premise that different voting procedures may lead to different outcomes. The author then fills a void in present literature by comparing voting procedures in terms of four issues: sophisticated versus sincere voting; sophisticated voters and simultaneous versus sequential voting; voter efficacy in plurality and approval voting; and the use of normative standards to compare outcomes. He proposes both a new model of sophisticated voting and normative standards for proportional representation procedures. This study addresses both the general reader interested in voting issues and the serious student of voting schemes, voting behavior, and social choice theory.
Topics In Social Choice is divided into three parts representing its three themes. It addresses theoretical and experimental aspects of sophisticated voting; the problem of efficacy and correct decision; and it concludes with an investigation of fair proportional representation. The volume represents the first attempt to address sophisticated and yet simultaneous voting. It is also the first to subject various voting models to competitive testing and provide a set of normative criteria for systems evaluation.
Topics In Social Choice is divided into three parts representing its three themes. It addresses theoretical and experimental aspects of sophisticated voting; the problem of efficacy and correct decision; and it concludes with an investigation of fair proportional representation. The volume represents the first attempt to address sophisticated and yet simultaneous voting. It is also the first to subject various voting models to competitive testing and provide a set of normative criteria for systems evaluation.
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
United States
Publishing group
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
Target group
College/higher education
Interest Age: From 7 to 17 years
Dimensions
Height: 240 mm
Width: 161 mm
Thickness: 17 mm
Weight
514 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-275-93430-9 (9780275934309)
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Schweitzer Classification
Person
DAN S. FELSENTHAL is Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Haifa, Israel. The author of Mathematics for Administrative Decision Makers (1976), he has published numerous articles on voting, bargaining, coalition theory and public choice theory.
Content
Preface Sophisticated Voting under the Plurality and Approval Procedures: Theoretical Models and Experimental Evidence Sophisticated Voting: Orientation and General Approach Two Models of Sophisticated Voting: Farquharson and Niemi-Frank The Social Desirability of Sincere and Sophisticated Voting under the Plurality and Approval Procedures The Chairman's Paradox and Its Extensions under Sophisticated Plurality and Approval Voting According to Models F and NF The Condorcet-Efficiency of Sophisticated Voting According to Model F under the Plurality and Approval Procedures Tacit Cooperation in Three-Alternative Noncooperative Voting Games: A New Model of Sophisticated Behavior under the Plurality and Approval Procedures Sincere versus Sophisticated Behavior Under PV and AV: A Competitive Test of Four Models Efficacy and "Correct Decisions" Efficacy in Small Electorates under the Plurality and Approval Procedures Is Cumulative Voting Really Different from Plurality Voting? On Combining Approval with Disapproval Voting Majority Rule, "Correct Decisions," and the Quorum Paradox Proportional Representation: Normative Schemes and an Empirical Evaluation of Voting Procedures Microcosms and Macrocosms: Normative Schemes for Seat Allocation in Proportional Representation Systems Proportional Representation: An Empirical Evaluation of the Plurality and Approval Procedures Appendix A: Possible Size Relations Among Four Blocs Appendix B: Proof of the Propositions in Chapter 6 Appendix C: Detailed Results of Experiments 1 and 2 Bibliography Author Index Subject Index