
Common Pool Resources
Strategic Behavior, Inefficiencies, and Incomplete Information
Cambridge University Press
Published on 21. October 2021
Book
Paperback/Softback
224 pages
978-1-108-92627-0 (ISBN)
Description
Common Pool Resources include, for instance, fishing grounds, irrigation systems, forests and the atmosphere. Now more than ever, how we responsibly share and use those goods is a vital issue. This textbook introduces students of economics, business and policy studies to the key issues in the field. It uses a game-theory approach to help readers understand the mathematical representation of how to find equilibrium behavior in CPRs, how to identify the socially optimal appropriation, and how to measure the inefficiencies that arise. Algebra and calculus steps are clearly explained, so students can more easily reproduce the analysis and apply it in their own research. Finally, the book also summarizes experimental studies that tested theoretical results in controlled environments, introducing readers to a literature that has expanded over the last decades, and provides references for further reading.
Reviews / Votes
'If you are looking for a textbook on common-pool resource problems that is both rigorous and intuitive, then you can't go wrong with this book. In a clear and engaging writing style, it provides comprehensive coverage of the individual and combined roles of strategic interactions, information and dynamics on the outcomes for all the involved parties. Professors and students will appreciate the analysis and exercises.' George Zaccour, HEC Montreal, Canada 'Common-pool-resources experience the tragedy of the commons. The wonderful framework presented in this book addresses strategic behavior, inefficiencies, and incomplete information, all of which challenge optimal CPR management. This introductory-level textbook features simple and simplified game theory models and an emphasis on the institutions behind the various modeling assumptions. Presented in a clear manner, this textbook is accessible to both senior undergraduates as well as to graduate students and scholars.' Ariel Dinar, University of California, Riverside 'This book provides an excellent explanation of common pool resources use by building a simple model and expanding on that model to incorporate many of the complexities associated with natural resources including repeated interactions, incomplete information, and uncertainty. The material presented introduces more complex economic modeling but at a level that is still useful for advanced undergraduates.' Adrienne Ohler, University of Missouri 'This textbook offers a great introduction to Common Pool Resources. It is a helpful tool that provides not only a step by step guide on how to solve CPR problems but also the economic interpretation of the results to help understand the intuition behind the outcomes.' Eleni Stathopoulou, Nottingham Trent UniversityMore details
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge
United Kingdom
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
Paperback (trade)
Illustrations
Worked examples or Exercises
Dimensions
Height: 229 mm
Width: 152 mm
Thickness: 12 mm
Weight
332 gr
ISBN-13
978-1-108-92627-0 (9781108926270)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

Ana Espinola-Arredondo | Felix Munoz-Garcia
Common Pool Resources
Strategic Behavior, Inefficiencies, and Incomplete Information
Book
10/2021
Cambridge University Press
€135.70
Shipment within 15-20 days

Ana Espinola-Arredondo | Felix Munoz-Garcia
Common Pool Resources
Strategic Behavior, Inefficiencies, and Incomplete Information
E-Book
10/2021
Cambridge University Press
€23.49
Available for download
Persons
Ana Espinola-Arredondo is a Professor in the School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
Author
Washington State University
Washington State University
Content
Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Common pool resources in a static setting; 3. Common pool resources in a dynamic setting; 4. Entry deterrence in the commons; 5. Repeated interaction in the commons; 6. Commons under incomplete information; 7. Signaling in the commons; Appendix A: game theory tools; Appendix B: solutions of selected end-of-chapter exercises.