Rule-Following and Realism
Published on 16. April 2001
Book
Paperback/Softback
388 pages
978-0-674-00555-6 (ISBN)
Description
Through detailed and trenchant criticism of standard interpretations of some of the key arguments in analytical philosophy over the last sixty years, this book arrives at a new conception of the proper starting point and task of the philosophy of language.
To understand central topics in the philosophy of language and mind, Gary Ebbs contends, we must investigate them from our perspective as participants in shared linguistic practices; but our efforts at adopting this participant perspective are limited by our lingering loyalties to metaphysical realism (the view that we can make objective assertions only if we can grasp metaphysically independent truth conditions) and scientific naturalism (the view that it is only within science that reality can be identified and described). In Rule-Following and Realism, Ebbs works to loosen the hold of these views by exposing their roots and developing a different way of looking at our linguistic practices.
Reexamining and extending influential arguments by Saul Kripke, W. V. Quine, Rudolf Carnap, Hilary Putnam, and Tyler Burge, Ebbs presents systematic redescriptions of our linguistic practices that transform our understanding of such central topics as rule-following, the analytic-synthetic distinction, realism, anti-individualism, the division of linguistic labor, self-knowledge, and skepticism.
To understand central topics in the philosophy of language and mind, Gary Ebbs contends, we must investigate them from our perspective as participants in shared linguistic practices; but our efforts at adopting this participant perspective are limited by our lingering loyalties to metaphysical realism (the view that we can make objective assertions only if we can grasp metaphysically independent truth conditions) and scientific naturalism (the view that it is only within science that reality can be identified and described). In Rule-Following and Realism, Ebbs works to loosen the hold of these views by exposing their roots and developing a different way of looking at our linguistic practices.
Reexamining and extending influential arguments by Saul Kripke, W. V. Quine, Rudolf Carnap, Hilary Putnam, and Tyler Burge, Ebbs presents systematic redescriptions of our linguistic practices that transform our understanding of such central topics as rule-following, the analytic-synthetic distinction, realism, anti-individualism, the division of linguistic labor, self-knowledge, and skepticism.
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge, Mass
United States
Target group
Professional and scholarly
US School Grade: College Graduate Student
Illustrations
none
Dimensions
Height: 227 mm
Width: 144 mm
Thickness: 25 mm
Weight
435 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-674-00555-6 (9780674005556)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Gary Ebbs
Rule-Following and Realism
E-Book
07/2009
Harvard University Press
€40.39
Available for download
Person
Gary Ebbs is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Content
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS INTRODUCTION Topics and Aims Structure of the Book and Links between the Topics Method PART 1: Rule-Following CHAPTER 1: Kripke's Skepticism about Meaning Assertion and Meaning Kripke's Dialectical Skepticism A First Look at Kripke's Understanding of Meaning Assertion, Meaning, Truth Conditions, and Rules The Rule Determines My Answer Following and Being Guided by a Rule The Normativity of Assertion and Meaning Normativity, Past Intentions, and Future Use Kripke's Skeptical Strategy Kripke's Skeptical Challenge The Challenge to Cite Facts That Determine What We Meant Kripke's Skeptical Arguments Kripke's Skeptical Conclusion Kripke's Objectifying Move Kripke's Metaphysical Realism CHAPTER 2: Quine's Scientific Skepticism about Meaning Dialectical Skepticism Contrasted with Scientific Skepticism Quine's Scientific Naturalism Naturalized Epistemology Posits and Reality From Naturalized Epistemology to Indeterminacy of Translation Collateral Information and Stimulus Meaning Inscrutability of Reference The Limits of Objective Translation Underdetermination and Indeterminacy Inscrutability of Reference and Acquiescing in Our Mother Tongue Logic, Disquotation, and Indeterminacy L Quine's Objectifying Move Quine's Objectifying Move Contrasted with Kripke's CHAPTER 3: The Very Idea of a Participant Perspective Toward a New Way of Looking at Meaning and Assertion A Metaphysical Critique of Scientific Naturalism The Fallacy of Subtraction Is Quine's Scientific Naturalism a Kind of Idealism? A Metaphilosophical Moral A First Look at McDowell's Strategy McDowell's Critique of Kripke McDowell's Critique of Wright McDowell's Trancendental Argument and the Middle Course Two Problematic Assumptions of McDowell's Argument A Metaphysical Realist Critique of McDowell's Arguments and His Middle Course A Reply from Wright A Reply from Quine Do These Criticisms Rest on a Misunderstanding of McDowell? The Methodological Moral My Strategy in the Rest of the Book PART 2: The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction CHAPTER 4: Carnap's Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Carnap's Project: The Codification of a Methodology for Rational Inquiry Pure and Descriptive Semantics, Explicit Rules, and Language Systems The Principle of Tolerance A First Sketch of the Pragmatic Roots of Carnap's Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Quine's Criticism of the Thesis That Logic Is True by Convention Carnap's Pragmatic Approach to Codifying Rules for Inquiry Mistakes and Discoveries in Logic and Mathematics 'Analytic in L' in Terms of State Descriptions 'Analytic in L' in Terms of State Descriptions and Meaning Postulates Pure and Descriptive Semantics Reichenbach's Coordinative Definitions The Analogy between Physical Geometry and Descriptive Semantics Beth's Criticism of Pure Semantics Carnap's Reply to Beth CHAPTER 5: Quine's Reasons for Rejecting Carnap's Analytic-Synthetic Distinction A Strategy for Clarifying Quine's Dispute with Carnap A Puzzling Exchange between Carnap and Quine Carnap and Quine on Language and Logic Carnap and Quine on the Interpretation of Artificial Notations Quine on Truth by Convention Again Preliminaries for Understanding Quine's Critique of Analyticity Definition and Interchangeability Semantical Rules Postulates, Semantical Rules, and the Task of Logic Indeterminacy and Carnap's Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Does Carnap Need a Criterion of Analyticity? Holism and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Carnap's Method versus Quine's Doctrine CHAPTER 6: Putnam's Reasons for Rejecting Carnap's Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Putnam and the Participant Perspective The Roots and Strategy of Putnam's Arguments Changes in Belief versus Changes in Reference Law-Cluster Concepts and Terms Framework Principles and the Contextually A Priori An Objection from Carnap's Point of View A Reply from Putnam's Point of View Analyticity and One-Criterion Words The Method behind Putnam's Criticisms Why Putnam's Critique of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction is Incompatible with Quine's Against Indeterminacy Four Preliminary Concerns PART 3: Anti-Individualism CHAPTER 7: From the Rejection of the Analytic Synthetic Distinction to Anti-Individualism The Participant Perspective and Anti-Individualism Sameness of Reference despite Radical Changes in Belief Idiolects, Disquotation and Changes in Belief Kripke's Causal Picture of Reference Putnam's Assimilation of Kripke's Causal Picture of Reference Two Roles for the Causal Picture of Reference The Division of Linguistic Labor and the Contribution of the Environment The Standard Metaphysical Picture of the Contribution of the Environment Two Versions of the Standard Metaphysical Picture Donnellan's Puzzle Vernacular Natural Kinds and Artifact Terms The Division of Linguistic Labor across Time Against Metaphysical Realism Our Linguistic Obligations Putnam's Causal Picture of Reference and Anti-Individualism CHAPTER 8: Participation, Deference, and Dialectic Anti-Individualism from Putnam to Burge Burge's Starting Point, Content Clauses, and Notions Step One of Burge's Arthritis Thought Experiment Steps Two and Three of Burge's Arthritis Thought Experiment Norms for Understanding, Conventional Linguistic Meaning, and Cognitive Value Complete and Incomplete Understanding and the Structure of Burge's Thought Experiments Essentialism and Rationalism about Notions A Strategy for Deflating Burge's Anti-Individualism Hare on Dancing the Eightsome Reel Burge's Dialectic Deflated A Deflationary View of Truth, Notions, and CHAPTER 9: Realism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism A Challenge from within the Participant Perspective Realism and Self-Knowledge in Context Self-Knowledge and Metalinguistic Beliefs Problematic Possibilities Why Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Is Incoherent The Misunderstanding behind Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Problematic Possibilities Disarmed Empirical Presuppositions and Skeptical Possibilities Two More Problematic Possibilities Empirical Presuppositions and Skeptical Possibilities Again Does Anti-Individualism Beg the Question against Skepticism? Truth and the Absolute Conception of Reality Nagel's Abstract Skepticism The Dissolution of the Absolute Conception of Reality CHAPTER 10: Anti-Individualism and Rule-Following Rule-Following Reconsidered Kripke's Dialectical Skepticism Rule-Following from the Participant Perspective How to Resist Kripke's Picture of Meaning and Assertion A Skeptical Reply Quine's Scientific Skepticism How to Resist Quine's Picture of Meaning and Assertion A Quinean Reply NOTES INDEX