Allocation, Information and Markets
Published on 21. September 1989
Book
Hardback
312 pages
978-0-333-49538-4 (ISBN)
Description
This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets. The foundations of most of neoclassical economics can be seen to be the concept of competitive equilibrium, which stems from the interaction of an economy-wide system of markets. In the 1950s, the Arrow-Debreu model of general equilibrium provided a new point of departure for such analyses and led naturally to an examination of the assumptions lying behind them, in particular to questions of how information and allocation interact. These essays aim to demonstrate how economists currently formulate and seek to answer these questions.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Basingstoke
United Kingdom
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
bibliography
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 156 mm
Weight
610 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-333-49538-4 (9780333495384)
Copyright in bibliographic data is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or its licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
John Eatwell | Murray Milgate | Peter Newman
Allocation, Information and Markets
Book
10/1989
Palgrave Macmillan
€32.09
Shipment within 15-20 days
John Eatwell | Murray Milgate | Peter Newman
Allocation, Information and Markets
E-Book
09/1989
Palgrave Macmillan
€29.99
Available for download
Content
Efficient allocation, S.Reiter; adverse selection, C.Wilson; asymmetric information, A.Postlewaite; auctions, V.L.Smith; bidding, R.Wilson; the coase theorem, R.D.Cooter; decentralization, E.Malivaud; economic organization and transaction costs, S.NM.S.Cheung; exchange, R.Wilson; experimental methods in economics, V.L.Smith; externalities, J.J.Laffont; fraud, E.Karni; hidden actions, moral hazard and contract theory, R.Guesnerie; implicit contracts, C.Azariadis; incentive compatibility, J.O.Ledyard; incentive contracts, E.P.Lazear; incomplete contracts, O.Hart; incomplete markets, C.Wilson; market failure, J.O.Ledyard; mechanism design, R.B.Myerson; moral hazard, Y.Kotowitz; natural selection and evolution, S.G.Winter; organization theory, T.Marschak; perfectly and imperfectly competitive markets, J.Roberts; principal and agent, J.E.Stiglitz; public goods, A.Sandmo; revelation of preferences, J.J.Laffont; search theory, P.Diamond; signalling J.G.Riley; teams, R.Radner.