
Sentencing Discretion and the Constitution
Due Process of Time
Donald A. Dripps(Author)
Oxford University Press Inc
Will be published approx. on 23. April 2026
Book
Hardback
240 pages
978-0-19-783036-9 (ISBN)
Description
The U.S. Supreme Court maintains that prosecutorial discretion to charge different offenses authorized by the penal code is practically limited only by the penal code itself. Because typical offense conduct violates multiple statutes carrying different maximum - and minimum - sentences, by choosing the charge, the prosecution commonly also chooses the sentence. The Court, however, holds that when judges exercise sentencing discretion, due process requires impeccable neutrality and adversary hearings.
Sentencing Discretion and the Constitution: Due Process of Time addresses the fundamental incompatibility of the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to the sentencing power of judges as compared to prosecutors. The Court says that when prosecutors induce a guilty plea by filing lesser charges than the code allows, the defendant is getting a break rather than being strong-armed. This doctrinal fiction persists because neither dissenting justices nor academic critics have yet justified a baseline by which the infliction of years - or even decades - in prison for refusing to plead guilty or to provide information, should be treated as a coercive threat rather than an offer permitted in the "give and take" of plea bargaining. In theory, the charges filed should be proportional to culpability, not the most severe the code permits. This raises another hard problem: theorists have not to date advanced a persuasive account of proportionate punishment.
Unlike prior works, Sentencing Discretion and the Constitution exposes the connections between these problems and proposes a unified solution. The right against excessive punishment, like the right against erroneous conviction, is best understood as a right to procedural justice. More broadly, curtailing prosecutorial sentencing is an essential step toward curtailing mass incarceration - a problem that otherwise is more likely to get worse than better.
This book will be of interest to readers concerned with plea bargaining, sentencing, constitutional law, legal history, and criminal law theory.
Sentencing Discretion and the Constitution: Due Process of Time addresses the fundamental incompatibility of the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to the sentencing power of judges as compared to prosecutors. The Court says that when prosecutors induce a guilty plea by filing lesser charges than the code allows, the defendant is getting a break rather than being strong-armed. This doctrinal fiction persists because neither dissenting justices nor academic critics have yet justified a baseline by which the infliction of years - or even decades - in prison for refusing to plead guilty or to provide information, should be treated as a coercive threat rather than an offer permitted in the "give and take" of plea bargaining. In theory, the charges filed should be proportional to culpability, not the most severe the code permits. This raises another hard problem: theorists have not to date advanced a persuasive account of proportionate punishment.
Unlike prior works, Sentencing Discretion and the Constitution exposes the connections between these problems and proposes a unified solution. The right against excessive punishment, like the right against erroneous conviction, is best understood as a right to procedural justice. More broadly, curtailing prosecutorial sentencing is an essential step toward curtailing mass incarceration - a problem that otherwise is more likely to get worse than better.
This book will be of interest to readers concerned with plea bargaining, sentencing, constitutional law, legal history, and criminal law theory.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
New York
United States
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Cloth over boards
Dimensions
Height: 242 mm
Width: 165 mm
Thickness: 23 mm
Weight
508 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-783036-9 (9780197830369)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Person
Donald A. Dripps is a graduate of Northwestern University and the University of Michigan Law School, where he was Editor-in-Chief of the Michigan Law Review. After law school, he clerked for second-circuit Judge Amalya Lyle Kearse, and then taught at Illinois and Minnesota before joining the faculty of the University of San Diego School of Law. His publications include About Guilt and Innocence: The Origins, Development, and Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure (Greenwood Press, 2003) and dozens of articles, including contributions to the Yale Law Journal and the California, Columbia, NYU, USC and Vanderbilt law reviews.
Author
Class of 1975 Endowed ProfessorClass of 1975 Endowed Professor, University of San Diego School of Law
Content
- Part I. The Doctrinal Problem
- Chapter 1: The Problem of Prosecutorial Sentencing
- Chapter 2: The Anomaly of Prosecutorial Sentencing Discretion
- Chapter 3: The Supreme Court and Judicial Sentencing Discretion
- Chapter 4: The Supreme Court and Prosecutorial Sentencing Discretion
- Chapter 5: The History of Sentencing Discretion
- Part II. The Theoretical Problems
- Chapter 6: The Baseline Problem in Criminal Procedure
- Chapter 7: The Proportionality Problem in Criminal Law
- Part III. Proportionate Punishment as Procedural Justice
- Chapter 8: Disproportionate Punishment and Convicting the Innocent
- Chapter 9: Proportionate Punishment as Procedural Justice
- Chapter 10: Implications
- Chapter 11: Engaging Objections