
An Identity Theory of Truth
J. Dodd(Author)
Palgrave Macmillan (Publisher)
Published on 14. October 2000
Book
Hardback
IX, 199 pages
978-0-312-23199-6 (ISBN)
Description
This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. According to Julian Dodd, facts are not complexes of worldly entities; they are, as Frege believed, true thoughts. The supposed truthmaker is nothing but the truthbearer.
The author christens this response to correspondence theories the modest identity theory, which he goes on to distinguish from those identity theories propounded, at some time or other, by Russell, Moore, Bradley, John McDowell and Jennifer Hornsby. It is acknowledged that the modest identity theory provides neither a definition of truth nor an account of what truth consists in. The modest identity theory's role is, by contrast, that of diagnosing the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby preparing the ground for a proper deflation of the concept of truth: a deflation defended in the latter part of the book.
More details
Edition
2000 ed.
Language
English
Place of publication
London
United Kingdom
Publishing group
Palgrave USA
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
IX, 199 p.
Dimensions
Height: 222 mm
Width: 145 mm
Thickness: 17 mm
Weight
406 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-312-23199-6 (9780312231996)
DOI
10.1007/978-1-349-62870-4
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

Person
Julian Dodd is Lecturer in Philosophy, Bolton Institute.