Practical Thought
Essays on Reason, Intuition, and Action
Published on 15. July 2021
Book
Hardback
426 pages
978-0-19-886560-5 (ISBN)
Description
Practical Thought: Essays on Reasons, Intuition, and Action presents a selection of Jonathan Dancy's most important philosophical essays since the late 1970s, focusing on the central themes of his work: metaethics, moral metaphysics, the theory of motivation, and the British Intuitionists. The twenty-four essays in this book chart his intellectual journey.
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Cloth over boards
Dimensions
Height: 239 mm
Width: 165 mm
Thickness: 30 mm
Weight
821 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-886560-5 (9780198865605)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
E-Book
07/2021
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€67.49
Available for download
E-Book
07/2021
1st Edition
OUP eBook
€67.49
Available for download
Person
Jonathan Dancy has worked at the University of Texas at Austin since 2005. He previously taught at the University of Keele for 25 years and then at the University of Reading before retiring in the UK in 2011. His books include Practical Reality (2000), Ethics Without Principles (2004), and Practical Shape (2018).
Content
Preface
Introduction: No More Answers
1: The Logical Conscience
Part 1: Towards particularism in ethics and epistemology
2: On Moral Properties
3: Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties
4: The Role of Imaginary Cases in Ethics
5: Intuitionism in Meta-epistemology
6: Externalism for Internalists
7: The Particularist's Progress
8: Necessity, Universality and the A Priori in Ethics
Part 2: Moral Metaphysics
9: Two Conceptions of Moral
10: Contemplating One's Nagel
11: In Defence of Thick Concepts
12: McDowell, Williams and Intuitionism
13: Practical Concepts
14: Should We Pass the Buck?
Part 3: Action and Reasons
15: Arguments from Illusion
16: Why there is No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation
17: How to Act - Disjunctively
18: Enticing Reasons
19: On Knowing One's Reason
Part 4: Learning from the Intuitionists
20: Prichard on Duty and Ignorance of Fact
21: Was Moore Right about Punishment?
22: Has Anyone Ever Been a Non-Intuitionist?
23: More Right than Wrong
24: Prichard on Causing a Change
Introduction: No More Answers
1: The Logical Conscience
Part 1: Towards particularism in ethics and epistemology
2: On Moral Properties
3: Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties
4: The Role of Imaginary Cases in Ethics
5: Intuitionism in Meta-epistemology
6: Externalism for Internalists
7: The Particularist's Progress
8: Necessity, Universality and the A Priori in Ethics
Part 2: Moral Metaphysics
9: Two Conceptions of Moral
10: Contemplating One's Nagel
11: In Defence of Thick Concepts
12: McDowell, Williams and Intuitionism
13: Practical Concepts
14: Should We Pass the Buck?
Part 3: Action and Reasons
15: Arguments from Illusion
16: Why there is No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation
17: How to Act - Disjunctively
18: Enticing Reasons
19: On Knowing One's Reason
Part 4: Learning from the Intuitionists
20: Prichard on Duty and Ignorance of Fact
21: Was Moore Right about Punishment?
22: Has Anyone Ever Been a Non-Intuitionist?
23: More Right than Wrong
24: Prichard on Causing a Change